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HOW TO CRACK PHOTOSHOP CC FOR FREE 2017 - Duration: 4:42.
For more infomation >> HOW TO CRACK PHOTOSHOP CC FOR FREE 2017 - Duration: 4:42. -------------------------------------------
How to Pop a PIMPLE on Your Skin the Right Way ? (tool for pimple) [TopPopping] - Duration: 2:37.
How to Pop a PIMPLE on Your Skin the Right Way ? (tool for pimple) [TopPopping]
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How to install One242415 Add-on Kodi 17 Krypton - Watch Movies, TV, Sports and More for FREE - Duration: 2:19.
One242415 Add-on has officially left the Phoenix.
add-on now he owns a separate standalone
Cody add-on this is a quick video on how
to install One242415 Add-on add-on in KODI Krypton
KODI Krypton. On KODI Krypton we need to go to
system file manager add source now type
this URL address sit down and give it
the name fusion fit okay and go back to
the home page now enter on add-ons and
next click on this package icon install
from zip file now enable the
installation of unknown sources enter in
settings and turn it on now go back
again and install from zip file enter on
fusion folder and next in cody repos
choose English and next install XBMC hub
repository next go ahead and install
from repository enter on TV add-ons AG
repo video add-ons now browse and enter
to install One242415 Add-on after install
go back to video add-ons and enjoy free
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free thanks for watching and hope you
enjoy this quick video hit the like
button I see you in next Kodi videos
Cheers
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Oggy and The Cockroaches New Cartoons for kids 2017 HD episode #3 - Duration: 2:12.
For more infomation >> Oggy and The Cockroaches New Cartoons for kids 2017 HD episode #3 - Duration: 2:12. -------------------------------------------
Children Basic Rules Of Safety - Child Basic Safety Rules Games By Gameiva - Kids Video Game - Duration: 5:39.
Children Basic Rules Of Safety - Child Basic Safety Rules Games By Gameiva - Kids Video Game
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Wine Picks For Spring - Duration: 4:24.
THEN THE HONDA ACCORD IS AN
ABSOLUTE MUST TO TEST DRIVE AND
COMPARE.
AFTER A ROLLER COASTER OF A
WEATHER WEEK WE'RE GETTING SOME
WARMER TEMPERATURES WITH
PASSOVER STARTING TOMORROW AND
EASTER NEXT WEEK THEIR PALLET
MIGHT COME TO LIGHTER ITEMS.
CERTIFIED WINE EXPERT JUAN
BRIGHTSTEIN JOINS US NOW.
THANKS SO MUCH FOR COMING.
GREAT TO BE HERE.
SO TELL ME WHAT MAKES A WINE
A SPRING WINE?
WELL USUALLY WHEN THE WEATHER
STARTS TO GET A LITTLE WARMER
LIKE THE DAY LIKE TODAY YOU WANT
TO HAVE SOMETHING A LITTLE
LIGHTER.
WE TEND TO DRINK HEAVIER RED
WINES OR BOLDER WHITE WINES.
GET A LITTLE SPRING IN THE STEP.
KIND OF GOES BET WE ARE SOME
OF THE SPRING MENUS I WOULD
THINK LIKE YOUR FOOD.
SO WHAT DO YOU HAVE FOR US
TODAY.
YOU HAVE A VARIETY FROM ROSE
OVER TO RED.
FIRST WE HAVE ROSE FROM
FRANCE.
IT'S THE FIRST TIME THAT THIS
HAS BEEN HERE IN THIS COUNTRY
FOR A LONG TIME BUT ROSE ARE
KIND OF THE IN THING.
THIS IS ACTUALLY THEY ONLY LEAVE
SHORT AMOUNT OF SKIN CONTACT ON
AND THAT'S WHY IT'S THE PINK
COLOR AS OPPOSED TO THE DARKER
RED.
AND IT'S VERY DELICIOUS
THAT'S THERE.
VERY TART, VERY BRIGHT.
AND THEREFORE REFRESHING DURING
THIS KIND OF WEATHER.
THERE'S SO MANY ROSES IN THE
STORE.
JUST TONS OF THEM.
AND YOU HAVE ONE OF MY FAVORITE
WINES COMING UP NEXT.
I HOPE YOU LIKE THIS ONE.
THIS IS FROM NEW ZEALAND.
IT'S A BLANC.
IT'S GOT A LITTLE OF THAT STINKY
KIND OF CHARACTER THAT.
DON'T CALL MY FAVORITE WINE
STINKY.
IT'S SUPPOSED TO BE LIKE
THAT.
WHY DO WE FIND THEM ALMOST
CITRUSY TASTING.
THAT'S WHAT I PICK UP ON.
IT'S ACTUALLY VERY GOOD.
I'M GLAD YOU LIKE IT.
I'M THINKING NOTES OF
GRAPEFRUIT.
YOU'RE RIGHT.
IT REALLY DOES HAVE A CITRUSY
KIND OF FLAVOR.
IT'S VERY REFRESHING AND WE
DRINK THEM A LOT.
SO THEN A LOT OF PEOPLE SO WE
STILL DRINK A LOT OF RED WINE
AND I HAPPEN TO LOVE PINOT NOIR.
IT'S VERY BRIGHT, LIGHT.
IT'S NOT REAL EXPENSIVE BUT IT'S
GOT A LOT OF FLAVOR.
ABOUT $12 A BOTTLE AND GIVE IT A
TASTE.
IT'S I THINK QUITE DELIGHTFUL
ESPECIALLY FOR THIS TIME OF
YEAR.
I LIKE THESE GLASSES.
THAT'S A PROPER GLASS TO
SERVE A PINOT NOIR IN.
I'M NOT THAT BIG ON RED BUT
THIS IS DELICIOUS.
GOOD I'M GLAD.
A LOT OF PEOPLE THINK YOU
NEVER PUT ANY KIND OF CHILL ON A
RED WINE BUT THAT'S NOT TRUE.
NO IN FACT A LOT OF TIMES YOU
GO OUT AND RED WINES ARE SERVED
TOO WARM.
PUT IT IN THE FRIDGE FOR
20 MINUTES BEFORE YOU'RE GOING
TO SERVE IT.
SOMETIMES PEOPLE JUST PUT IT ON
ICE JUST TO TAKE SOME OF THE
WHEN RED WINE GETS TOO WARM YOU
TASTE A LITTLE TOO MUCH TANNEN
TO IT.
IF YOU COOL IT OFF A LITTLE IT
CUTS THAT.
I'M NOTICING ALL THE PRICES
ARE PRETTY REASONABLE.
THAT'S ONE THING.
HALF A MINUTE HERE.
SO THIS IS A WINE FROM ITALY
IF YOU LIKE SOMETHING A LITTLE
HARDY BUT NOT TOO HEAVY.
IT'S A KORVINA AND IT'S
DELICIOUS.
EASY TO DRINK BUT GOT A NICE
FULLNESS TO IT.
FOR FULL COMPARED TO THE
OTHER ONES.
AND AS SHE SAID ALL THESE WINES
ARE REASONABLY PRICED.
EVERYTHING WE BROUGHT TODAY
ARE UNDER $15.
COMING UP SOON.
COME BACK ANY TIME.
IT'S A LITTLE EARLY FOR ME BUT
THIS GUY LOVES IT.
I'M SURPRISED MARISSA DIDN'T
COME BACK.
YEAH, RIGHT.
THANK YOU.
GOOD TO HAVE YOU.
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Prince Harry's girlfriend Meghan Markle's family DIVIDED over half sister's plan for tell all book - Duration: 2:24.
MEGHAN MARKLE�S family have turned on her half sister Samantha Grant after her plans
to release a tell-all book.
The planned publication is said to include Samantha�s memories of growing up with Prince
Harry�s girlfriend, and claimed it is entitled: �The Diary of Princess Pushy�s Sister�.
But members of the Suits actress� family have hit back at the 52 year old, who previously
claimed Meghan is a �social climber�.
Samantha launched a series of tweets last month where she suggested Meghan had ignored
her since she was wheelchair bound with multiple sclerosis and said she has a �hardened heart�
But Samantha�s own mother Roslyn has branded her claims as �bull***t�.
�She trashes Meghan, trashes me, her dad, her brothers she�s just been trashing everybody
in her life forever,� Roslyn, 71, told Mail Online.
She continued: �I am very serious when I say she has dogged on Meghan forever.
She has never liked Meghan and she�s always been jealous of her.� Meghan�s brother
Thomas Jr, 50, has also hit back at Samantha telling her to �leave Meghan along already�.
He said: �She's just doing it because she's got nothing better to do and it's what she's
always done.
Her whole life has just been about being a pain in the a**.
�It's why nobody talks to her and hasn't for a long, long time.
Leave Meghan alone already it's ridiculous.� Samantha is the daughter of Meghan�s father
Thomas Markle Snr and his first wife Roslyn.
Last month, Meghan�s half sister caused a stir amongst the family after she launched
a scathing attack on the star on Twitter after the humanitarian penned an essay on the stigma
surrounding women�s periods.
In response to Serena Williams� Tweet which praised Meghan's inspiring piece, Samantha
questioned what �real change� Meghan brought about and asked if it was simply for a �photo
op�.
thanks for watching.
please subscribe my channel.
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Dept of Defense w/CC: 3-23-17. Senate Hearing On Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. - Duration: 1:08:09.
- Order.
I'd like to welcome everyone here today
for this very timely hearing on the Department
of Defense Countering weapons Weapons
of Mass Destruction Policy and Programs
for Fiscal Year 2018.
The pursuit and potential use of weapons
of mass destruction remains a high consequence threat
to our national security.
To date, the Department of Defense efforts to prevent,
protect against, and respond to weapons of mass destruction
threats have kept the use of these weapons low.
Despite these efforts, recent media reports
of chemical weapons use in Iraq and Syria,
continued nuclear weapons develop in North Korea
and the asymmetric use of nerve agent remind us
the threat is real, global in nature,
and potentially growing.
A key challenge in countering this threat
is that many technologies that are used
for peaceful civilian purposes can also potentially
be used for developing weapons of mass destruction.
Emerging examines of these dual-use technologies
are in the fields of synthetic biology and gene editing.
Rapidly developing biotechnologies that are easily
obtained present new threats to the war fighter
that we have yet to fully understand.
Today's hearing will allow our subcommittee
to provide critical oversight on ensuring
that the Department's Countering Weapons
of Mass of Destruction policies, plans, and programs
sufficiently address these emerging threats.
Let me now turn to ranking member Jim Langevin
of Rhode Island for any opening comments
he'd like to make.
- Thank you, Madam Chair.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today.
Dr. Hopkins and Mr. Ageage, very nice to see you here
and Mr. Hem, great to be with you for the first time.
So thank you.
Before I give the rest of my opening statement, though,
I do want to take a minute to acknowledge
Ms. Katie Sigh.
A Sandia National Laboratory Fellow
that has been on HASC for the last two years.
Katie returns to Sandia to work on cyber programs
next week.
During her tenure on HASC, Katie's been a tremendous asset
and has worked in a bipartisan fashion,
particularly on CWMB issues.
She has many accomplishments to be proud of,
such as the biodefense strategy provision
in the fiscal year 2017 NDAA,
on which she was to lead.
Katie, I just wanna say thank you for your hard work
on behalf of the ETC subcommittee.
We wish you well.
- Thank you, sir.
- Thanks.
Well, today, we meet to review the efforts
by the Department of Defense to address the threat
of weapons of mass destruction.
This is an important topic
for oversight by the subcommittee.
And I look forward to hearing about the policies
and programs at the Department of Defense
to counter this threat.
During this past year, we've continued
to receive media reports of the use of these weapons,
including the use of chemical weapons by ISIS
in Iraq and Syria, and the use
of VX nerve agent by North Korea.
These reports illustrate the importance of robust efforts
to protect the services and the nation from this
continually evolving threat.
Last fall, the agency formally known
as the Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Agency, or JTDA,
was transitioned to the Joint Improvised Threat
Defeat Organization, JIDO, within the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
This change offers the opportunity to achieve savings
through common efficiencies and to leverage synergy
in the organization's missions.
Efficiencies and synergy include streamlining
the command structure of JIDO
to align consolidating human resources
and other overhead functions and reducing mission
and program overlap in order to focus JIDO
on its core task and to avoid mission creep.
It's important that we continue to evaluate
the Department's programs and efforts to ensure
they're efficiently and effectively meeting
the requirements of our war fighters.
last few years, we have been briefed
by the Department on Constellation.
A prototype of a new CWMD situational awareness technology.
I certainly look forward to hearing what efforts
Department has been taking
to work with special operations command,
which has recently taken over the mission
for global synchronization for counter weapons
of mass destruction to understand the requirements
of the commander and leverage any existing systems
to meet these needs.
Finally, the confluence of the fiscal year 2017
end-of-year appropriations, fiscal year 2017
supplemental request, and fiscal year 2018 budget outline
have no doubt created challenges in execute
and planning programs.
So I'd like to ask our witnesses to talk
about the day-to-day challenges of uncertainty
in their priorities in all three
of these funding mechanisms.
With that, I thank you again to our witnesses
for appearing before us today.
And, Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
- We have before us a panel of
three distinguished witnesses.
Dr. Arthur Hopkins, acting assistant secretary of defense
for nuclear, chemical, and biological defense programs.
Mr. Peter Verga, performing the duties of assistant
secretary of defense for Homeland Defense
and Global Security.
And Ms. Shari Durand, acting director of DTRA,
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
While detailed budget numbers for fiscal year 2018
are not available at this time,
we look forward to a robust discussion on the policies
and programs in place in the Department
for countering weapons of mass destruction in 2018.
Welcome to all of our witnesses.
I'd like to remind you that your testimony will be included
in the record, and we ask that you summarize key points
from that testimony in 5 minutes or less.
And before we begin with Dr. Hopkins,
I also would like to take a moment
to recognize Katie Sutton,
who will be returning to Sandia National Laboratories
having completed her two-year fellowship with our committee.
Katie has been an integral part of our team
and helped us legislate and conduct oversight
in many important and complex areas.
Indeed, many of the same things we plan on discussing today.
Katie, thank you for your hard work over the past two years,
and we wish you continued success.
And with that, Dr. Hopkins, we can begin with you,
and we look forward to your opening statement.
- Thank you, Chairwoman Stefanik.
Ranking Member Langevin.
And distinguished members of the subcommittee.
I appreciate this opportunity to testify
on the Department's efforts to counter threats posed
by weapons of mass destruction.
The office of the assistant secretary for nuclear, chemical,
and biological defense programs has roots that go back
to the establishment of the Department
when it was focused primarily on nuclear deterrents.
Since then, the organization's responsibilities
have expanded to include nuclear, chemical,
and biological defense programs, which are carried out
by four organizations within the NCP enterprise.
Our nuclear matters office is the focal point
for DOD activities and initiatives for sustaining a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
Our chemical and biological defense program develops
capabilities that enable war fighters to deter, prevent,
protect, mitigate, respond to, and recover
from traditional and emerging threats.
Through our threat reduction and arms control office,
oversight of the nation's chemical demilitarization program
focuses on the safe, complete, and treaty-compliant
destruction of the nation's remaining
chemical weapons stockpile.
In addition, we ensure DOD compliance with nuclear,
chemical, and biological treaties and agreements.
And our countering weapons of mass destruction systems
programs strengthens situational awareness
of global WMD activities.
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency addresses
the full spectrum of WMD related threats,
including cooperative threat reduction programs
and support to combat commands.
As well as threats from improvised devices.
Today, I'd like to highlight some of the enduring
and the emerging challenges and threats in each area,
the ongoing activities that we're conducting
to address those challenges,
and our priorities moving forward.
To counter current and emerging threats,
like those enabled by synthetic biology
and non-traditional agents,
the chemical and biological defense program
is developing new strategies to anticipate, prepare,
and more rapidly respond, especially in the area
of medical countermeasures, in addition to developing
protective equipment and detection systems.
In domestic chemical demilitarization,
the Department continues to make significant progress
in meeting the nation's commitment
under the chemical weapons convention
by working toward eliminating the last of our remaining
chemical weapons stockpiles in Colorado and Kentucky.
In September '16, the Department started agent destruction
operations at the Pueblo, Colorado, site.
At Bluegrass, Kentucky,
facility construction is complete.
And destruction systems are being tested.
With the United States special operations command's
new leadership role in countering weapons
of mass destruction mission, we've engaged closely with them
to understand the mission needs
for global situational awareness.
WMD threat reduction programs executed
by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency continue to reduce
the threat of weapons of mass destruction around the world
by detecting and preventing proliferation and consolidating,
securing, and eliminating dangerous pathogens
and materials of concern.
These efforts are conducted in cooperation
with partners throughout the wolrd as they enhance their own
capacity to secure WMD materials, detect,
and interdict proliferation and respond
to WMD related events.
WMD threats are real.
The Department's activities to help reduce
these threats include the full spectrum
of countering weapons of mass destruction activities.
From preventing acquisition to containing
and reducing threats, to supporting crisis response.
I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify,
and also thank you for your enduring interest
and support to these important mission areas.
- Thank you, Mr. Verga.
- Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin,
members of the committee, again,
thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
I'm honored to be here with Dr. Hopkins and Ms. Durand
to present the Department's approach to countering chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear threats.
Since the Department testified before this subcommittee
on this subject one year ago, two CBRN related threats
have dominated the headlines,
those posed by North Korea and the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria, or ISIS, both highlight the complex nature
of the threat we face.
The North Korean regime has increased its dangerous
and provocative CBRN related activities
over the past year.
It's continued to test nuclear weapons
and ballistic missiles in clear violation
of multiple United Nations Security Counsel resolutions.
ISIS poses a different sort of CBRN threat
as a non-state actor, not bound by long-standing norms
and laws and with a demonstrated willingness
to use chemical weapons against civilians
and combatants alike.
While ISIS capabilities are currently far less sophisticated
than North Korea's, its willingness to use
and potentially proliferate CBRN related materials,
or knowledge, to its affiliates elsewhere
is of grave concern.
The Department's strategic approach to countering
these threats focuses on three lines of effort.
Preventing acquisition of WMD,
containing and reducing threats,
and mitigating the consequences of potential use.
Our efforts to address these threats for North Korea
and ISIS reflect this approach.
To prevent the transfer of CBRN or dual-use materials
to and from North Korea, the Department works closely
with interagency partners in part through outreach
under the Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI,
to the 104 other PSI endorsees committed to
preventing WMD proliferation.
With committed allies and partners are foundational
to our success.
We also engage with partners through
the DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction program,
which remains in the words of Secretary of Defense Mattis,
the Department's most comprehensive and effective tool
for working cooperatively with partners
to mitigate CBRN related threats.
Through DTRA's capable impilation, CTR is engaged
in over 30 countries helping them detect, secure,
or eliminate CBR and related materials
and pathogens of security concern.
These efforts are integrated with those
of our interagency partners.
In southeast Asia, CTR is building the capabilities
of our partners to detect and prevent maritime
proliferation of CBRN related materials,
such as those headed to or from North Korea.
Despite our best efforts at prevention,
we must be prepared to contain and reduce CBRN threats
once they have developed.
For instance, to contain and reduce the CBRN threats
from ISIS, the U.S. and our coalition partners
are also exploited opportunities on the ground
to better understand and disrupt their CW networks.
The, excuse me, the DOD CTR program is also strengthening
Jordan's and Lebanon's capacity to prevent proliferation
of CBRN materials from Iraq and Syria into their territories
and to ensure that ISIS affiliates in Libya
do not acquire or proliferate a CBRN capability.
We supported interagency efforts
to remove chemical precursors from Libya
and initiated a proliferation prevention program
with the government of Tunisia
along its border with Libya.
Elsewhere, DOD is working our key regional allies,
the Republic of Korea and Japan,
to ensure that our focus remains postured to respond to CBRN
contingencies or emanating from the Korean peninsula.
Complementing those engagements
in the CBRN preparedness program, or CP Two,
which engages bilaterally with our partner nations
to respond to and mitigate effects of a CBRN incident.
In addition to being prepared to respond to events overseas,
DOD must ensure we are prepared to support
the federal response to a domestic CBRN incident at home.
Working closely with the joint staff,
we continue to partner with a wide array
of interagency partners,
including the Departments of Homeland Security, Energy,
and Justice, to ensure a coordinated response
to any event in the homeland.
In conclusion, the acquisition or use of CBRN weapons
against the United States, our or forces, or our interests,
remains among the most dangerous threats we face.
With your support, the Department will continue
to strengthen our capabilities and relationships
to reduce these threats at home and abroad.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
And I look forward to any questions you may have.
- Thank you.
Ms. Durand.
- Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin,
and members of the subcommittee.
It is an honor to be here today to share with you the work
of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
DTRA makes the United States and our allies safer
by countering threats pose by the proliferation
and use of weapons of mass destruction.
While not a direct focus of today's hearing,
DTRA also has a new mission area,
countering improvised explosive devices
and other improvised threats.
Last October, the Department transitioned
the Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Organization, JIDO,
under the authority, direction, and control of DTRA.
DTRA is a unique organization with a broad portfolio
that is accomplished by an incredibly capable
and talented workforce.
We are very proud of some recent milestones,
including the accomplishments
of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,
which celebrated its 25th anniversary last December.
In this coming April, we will celebrate the 70th anniversary
of DTRA's Defense Nuclear Weapon's school located
in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Our expertise spans the full spectrum of WMD threats.
Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons
and high-yield explosives.
We are a one-stop shop,
open 24 hours a day to support the Department's functional
and geographic combatant commands, the military services,
and the interagency.
Over the past three years,
DTRA moved to a regional, vice-programmatic approach
against WMD threats.
This allow us to support war fighters
and allies with more comprehensive and integrated methods
that are better aligned with the combatant commands.
Likewise, our regional approach ensures a more holistic
prioritization of the science and technology
that DTRA pursues and a better understanding
of how we transition those capabilities to the war fighter
and military services.
In Iraq and Syria, ISIS is using chemical weapons
on the battlefield.
Thankfully, the authorities and funding that Congress
provides DTRA each year allows us
to support operation inherent resolve
and to respond to these and other
emerging long-term WMD challenges.
I am proud of what our team has accomplished this past year
and believe that we serve as good stewards
of taxpayer's dollars.
As we look forward fiscal year 2018,
I am confident that we are prepared to address future WMD
and improvised threats around the world.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here.
And I look forward to your questions.
- Thank you, Ms. Durand.
My first question is, the FY17 NDAA authorized
funding for many critical activities
within the Chemical and Biological Defense program,
The Chemical Demilitarization program, and at DTRA.
What have been the impacts of the continuing resolution,
the CR, so far this fiscal year?
And can you describe the impacts to your programs
for a full year CR for fiscal year 2017.
Dr. Hopkins.
- Thank you, Chairwoman, for the question.
We are making it work.
Because it is the reality of the budget situation.
But the continuing resolution really limits our ability
to do longer-term planning because of the ways
the funds come in in increments.
And so, I would say that the nature of the people who do
the work for us is such that they will make
the programs work given the constraints.
However, it does limit our ability to plan and adapt,
especially if things come up in near term or medium term
that require different levels of funding,
the continuing resolution doesn't allow that,
so it does tie our hands a bit.
- [Chairwoman Stefanik] Mr. Verga.
- I would just go along with what Dr. Hopkins said.
It's obviously always better to have a full year's budget
appropriation because it does allow you to implement
a program that you've laid out in an orderly fashion,
given what you expected to get in the appropriations
that were asked for in the budget.
And a CR, it just trips you up what you get started
and you can't really do what you need to do.
- [Chairwoman Stefanik] And Ms. Durand.
- Give you a couple specifics from an agency perspective.
One, it more than doubles our workload.
When you do incremental funding,
as the CR funding comes in,
we're having to incrementally fund all of our contracts.
So that means for the contracting staff
who is already overworked, they are, in essence,
doubling their work throughout the year.
That also adds to our comptroller's support office,
who are also having to do a lot of accounting
and other budgetary actions when the Department
is working very hard towards our financial improvement
and audit readiness.
So part of that is just the workload capacity.
As Dr. Hopkins said, we will get it done.
But at a time when we need everybody more focused
on direct mission support, that makes it difficult.
For us, specifically, another one that we encountered
when JIDO came under us,
one of the things we didn't expect was in the '16 budget
was with the Army because the Army was
the executive agent for JIDA.
Because of the continuing resolution,
that funding was appropriated to the Army.
And it did not come directly to DTRA.
So, again, that means the accounting
and the budgetary means it has to go
on if the money goes onto the Army,
we have to get it from the Army.
We have to do double budgeting
and a lot of budgetary transfers in our books.
So it just makes it very complicated.
- Thank you very much.
It's important for us to get on the record
the negative impacts that a continued CR
would have on the DOD.
So thank you for those thoughtful answers.
My second question is for Dr. Hopkins.
Recent technological advances in the areas
of synthetic biology and gene editing have created
a biorevolution that has increased the capability
and availability of biotechnology.
Last fall the president's council of advisors on science
and technology released a report on this topic
that concluded, "Just as rapid advances in biotechnology
"have increased the risk of misuse by bad actors,
"they have expanded the tools available
"to protect the public."
How is the DOD responding to the emerging threat
faced by these two technologies?
And can the Department apply these new technologies
to counter the potential threat?
- Thank you, Chairwoman, for the question.
You're absolutely right.
The new technologies really are a double-edged sword.
One of the challenges we have is in addressing in looking
at the potential affects on national security.
We want to make sure that the things that we do to try
to protect ourselves don't interfere with the development
or the application of the technology
for peaceful, useful purposes.
And so, that, combined with the fact
that it is an emerging area,
it really causes us to step back and try to understand,
what will be, what could be the potential national
security impacts of synthetic biology?
We have asked the National Academy of Sciences to step
in help us in an interagency study to look
at the potential impacts on security.
About what timeframe would we expect potential nefarious
capabilities to be available to bad actors?
And what can we do about it?
And the things that we would do
about it really fall into at least three areas,
the ability to know what's happening in the first place
because if we're talking about a biological threat,
how do you know what it is?
How do you know it's appeared?
And so, we're working very hard on detection technologies
to understand when and if we may be subject
to those kinds of attacks.
Protection is secondary.
As you know, the classic chemical biological protection
is a mask, a suit, a glove.
An individual protection,
collected protection, that sort of thing.
We have to make sure that our science base is up
to the task and actually developing capabilities
to protect the war fighter.
And so, challenging the things that we have on hand now
that are classical in the face of those kinds
of threats is very important.
Third area is mitigation.
What are you gonna do about it?
And since we're talking about biological side of things,
medical countermeasure development is
right at the forefront.
The same tools, synthetic biology,
that we're concerned about as being capable
of being used against us,
we are also using in the laboratories
to help to develop countermeasures.
And so, our ability to come up with vaccines, therapeutics,
even laboratory equipment that will help identity
what the threat is, very important to us.
And so, those three areas, detection, protection,
and medical countermeasures and mitigation
are the places where we are investing
to try to counter that.
- Thank you, Dr. Hopkins.
I now recognize Mr. Langevin.
- Thank you to our witnesses again for being here.
Ms. Durand, if I could start with you,
JIDA was an organization that
continually evolved and had an uncertain future.
As I mentioned in my opening statement,
the alignment of JIDO under DTRA,
it should result in both synergy
and efficiencies as well as provide an opportunity
to focus JIDO on its core mission and define its future.
So I wanted to know what synergies are there
between DTRA and JIDO.
What efficiencies have been achieved as a result
of the realignment.
And how is the Department using the alignment
as an opportunity to focus JIDO on its core mission
and the size scope of the organization
for that mission to achieve maximum effectiveness.
And, finally, has the term improvised threat been defined?
So, if you want me to repeat any of those
I threw a lot at you, I'd be glad to, so.
- Thank you for those questions.
Two weeks ago, we briefed
the staffers on highlighting all the efficiencies
that we have gained since JIDO came under us.
I would preface all my comments with,
it really has only been since October.
So we spent, after the decision was made last January
up until October when they officially came under us,
spending a lot of time getting everything ready
to come under us, that was an enormous challenge just
getting 235 JIDO civilian employees transferred
from the Army into DTRA.
One of the first things that we did is
we have consolidated eight of the offices
that were previously in JIDO.
Those are the ones that you touched on,
human resources, inspector general,
contracts, comptroller, general counsel,
legislative and public affairs,
security and counterintelligence.
JIDA at the time was standing up
to be its own defense agency,
so those offices were standing up,
so we just took those offices and those individuals
and merged them into ours.
And so, we're moving forward with they have
entirely new systems that they have to learn.
So we're spending a lot of time getting them up to speed.
You had mentioned in your opening comments
about the senior structure.
So JIDO previously had four
senior executive service members.
One of those was a term appointment, so that's been,
that ended.
So we're at least, we are working on recognizing
the need to shrink that senior leadership level down.
So we are pushing towards that.
The efficiency, so two key areas that we're looking
at in information technology and our research
and development capacities.
DTRA has a lot of test-bed capacity
in our research and development test
and evaluation world.
And JIDA will be able to use those test ranges
so that will in time reduce their costs associated
with test-range costs.
So that's one specific thing.
JIDA was very proficient, and has a great deal of experience
in information technology,
especially how it supports the war fighter.
So all their efforts that they have spent years developing
on situational awareness for improvised threats on attacking
those networks, we're finding to be very helpful to us
in the CWMD community.
So we are, in our IT worlds, they are working very much
together to figure out what synergies that are there,
what can we combine, what things may need
to remain separate.
We have also recognized the committee's desire
to show savings.
We are keeping track of those.
I cannot sit here and tell you we have gained
a tremendous amount of savings.
It takes quite a bit for this type of an integration.
There are a lot of upfront costs and time that go into it.
But we fully expect over a certain amount of time,
and it may take a couple years,
that we would be able to come back to you
and show you specific metrics and dollar savings.
One quick one I would give you is,
when JIDA was going to stand up,
they were going to have to buy
their backroom human resources services.
So that's a processing a lot of actions.
They would have gained those services
from the Defense Logistics Agency,
which is a working capital entity.
So they would have been paying DLA for that support.
So it was about $1.5 million.
So that's a cost avoidance that avoided with that,
and now they're just merged in with ours.
So we are seeing some savings,
but I would expect them to grow over time.
To your question on focusing on the mission,
so we do think that because they're now under DTRA,
and they're not having to do all the things related
to being a separate entity and a separate agency,
they will benefit from all the structure
that we have in place already.
So they don't have to be bothered with that.
To your specific question,
is improvised threats defined well?
No.
You could use the term improvised threats,
and that could be everything that goes on
within the Department.
So we're continuing to look at and to make sure
that we're following, I think, the guidance the committee
has been concerned about before the mission creep.
I hope I addressed each one.
- You did, you hit them all.
That's very good.
Thank you very much.
My time's expired.
Hopefully, we'll get to a second round.
But if not, I yield back.
Thank you.
- Dr. Wenstrup.
- Thank you, Madam Chair.
I appreciate it.
Thank you all for being here today and very interesting
and concerning topic as you well know.
Dr. Hopkins, I want to talk to you for a little bit.
I look back at DOD response to the Ebola virus
and our engagement there.
And I think actually a lot to be proud of with that mission
and challenging situation.
I also look at the balance of the Department of Defense
or the military to serve in combat roles.
And that's not a combat role,
but we could be in a combat environment
where there's an outbreak
of some entity like that that we have to be concerned with.
And then where does HHS come into play?
And how do you see those roles, do they cooperate?
How are we engaging in that way,
and what were the lessons learned from that mission?
- Thank you very much for the question.
I think the success of the defense chemical
biological defense program is very, very much dependent
on how well we coordinate with the other government
stakeholders in this area.
Health and Human Services, Homeland Social Security,
CDC, National Institutes of Health, Agriculture.
I mean, there are a number of government agencies,
all of whom have a stake in this area.
Our focus is on biological threat agents.
And so, in order to make sure that the war fighter has the
therapeutics and the diagnostics
and the capabilities to know that they're under attack
and even protect them with vaccines.
I don't want to call it a niche,
but that's a very important part,
that's a lead part of what we do.
Having said that, the sciences, science associated
with developing those countermeasures
as well as the coordination on the basic science for this
is something that we have to share.
And I think that happens very effectively through a group
called PHEMCE, the Public Health Emergency Medical
Countermeasured Enterprise.
It's all the agencies that I just mentioned
all coming together primarily for the purpose
of making sure that the nation (cuts out)
of therapeutics and vaccines
in the event of a natural outbreak.
But we also leverage that capability to make sure
that the Department has what it needs.
As far as lessons learned from the Ebola outbreak,
to me, the single largest lesson is that the Department
has a lot to offer.
While we may not have the lead in a natural outbreak,
the Department has quite a capability
that we can leverage and we can contribute to natural
outbreaks like that.
Again, going back to the original,
my original point, the number one lesson we learned
is it's really, really important to to be talking to
and collaborating with other government agencies
who have a stake in the successful outcome
of events like those.
- In that particular situation,
you know, you don't know these outbreaks are coming.
These are new viruses.
I'm just curious how the military trains
for that mission?
I guess it's more generic training
and education as you roll out, I would imagine.
Would that be be case?
- I think it's actually that.
But it's also the military laboratories.
The Navy laboratories, the Army laboratories,
are always forward looking,
and they're always coordinating with the civilian side
to make sure that the military has the situational awareness
and knows what capabilities are out there,
our own and on the civilian side.
So, again, I think it comes down to the collaboration
and the situational awareness that's provided
by the leading-edge researchers
and developers at the service laboratories.
- And the coordination has been good in your opinion?
- Yes, it has been.
- Thank you.
Ms. Durand, if I could ask you real quickly,
in the intelligence community,
how's the cooperation between the intelligence community
and with what's going on?
We'd always hate to hear that there wasn't
conversation back and forth.
Do you feel like there are any gaps there
that we need to address?
Should Congress be helping in any way in that regard?
- I will tell you that DTRA enjoys an an incredibly strong
partnership across the entire intelligence community.
I would also tell you that in the very short time that U.S.
SOCOM has had the synchronization mission,
they have, they are so interwoven with the entire
intelligence community, General Thomas in particular
is very actively going after this in terms of what else
does he need from the intelligence community
for the CWMD mission.
And I have no doubt he will make great strides
in that regard.
We've also experienced in some recent
exercises that some of my folks have participated in.
The feedback that I get from them is that
they have never seen a time when there was more involvement
and better partnership across the entirely interagency,
with our allies, and with the intelligence community.
So I can't tell you that I see any gap.
I can give you the assurance, that if there is one,
General Thomas will find it, and he will correct it.
- Okay, thank you.
I yield back.
- [Chairwoman Stefanik] Ms. Gabbard.
- Thank you very much.
Prior to the first Gulf War it was disclosed
that Iraq had produced 19,000 liters of concentrated
botulin A toxin to be used in weapons.
Given that one aerosolized gram of this toxin
could potentially kill up to 1 million people,
where would DTRA rank this toxin in terms of threat level,
where we are today?
- So, that one, I'm not sure.
So I'd like to take that one for the record
and get to you so I give you the correct answer.
- Sure, I appreciate it.
As you go through that follow-up,
I'd be interested to see if there are any current programs
or plans underway that recognize this threat
and countermeasures to deal with it.
Given that the FDA approval process
for medical countermeasures can be lengthy
and unpredictable, what kind of risk does that present
to the DOD in wait times for FDA approvals
for any countermeasures that we may need
in a tighter timeline?
Generally, not specifically for this toxin, but generally?
- DTRA's not specifically involved in that piece
of the process.
I would defer to Dr. Hopkins on any
of those specifics.
- [Ms. Gabbard] Sure.
- Thank you very much.
First of all, let me say that the FDA
approval process is critically important to the successful
production of vaccines and therapeutics that we need.
And so, having said that,
we are doing everything we can to work with the FDA
starting early in the process.
We've learned, over the years, that it's best to engage
with the Food and Drug Administration very, very early.
So that we can understand the process
as well as work with them in speeding things up.
We also, through the passing of the Cures Act,
we in the Department have authority now
to offer priority review vouchers
and obtain orphan drug designations for some of our
low-volume, limited distribution kind of products.
And so that is very, very helpful to us.
In fact, most recently, the plague vaccine
has received FDA orphan drug status.
And that was funded by the defense program.
So bottom is, we are using whatever means we can
to accelerate and work very closely
and early with the Food and Drug Administration
because we know that their involvement is important
to the production of safe products.
- Understood.
Thank you, I yield back.
- [Chairwoman Stefanik] Dr. Abraham.
- Thank you, Chairwoman.
Thank the witnesses for being here.
This is a vital topic, in my opinion.
And Mr. Verga, thank you for your service in Vietnam.
We appreciate that very much, sir.
I'm gonna pony a little bit off Dr. Wenstrup
and Chairwoman Stefanik and go back to the
synthetic biology of all this nuclear, chemical,
and biological things that do keep me awake at night.
I think the biological is the one that I spend
most of the time looking at the ceiling because it's cheap,
it's available, and as Dr. Wenstrup alluded to,
you can have a human vector to transmit the pathogen.
And to weaponize a virus or a bacteria,
with what you gentleman know of, certainly you, Dr. Hopkins,
with the CRISPR-Cas9 technology,
the genetic engineering, which can be done now
in any biochemical lab with a person
of just normal intelligence that has a master's
or certainly a Ph.D. in that type of instance,
this can be become a real threat very quickly.
My question, Dr. Hopkins, to you first,
you said you were, and I understand,
talking state governments and the people and those agencies
that we need to talk to, but we all know that
if a terrorist organization wants to do this,
we're not talking to them.
Are there any, and I understand it's difficult,
but are there any checks and balances today
that at least can give us a little hint
of something that may be coming?
Because as Ms. Gabbard said with botulism,
mitigation is not an option here,
because we're too far behind the power curve.
So the question is, what's out there to stop this?
And what can we as Congress do to help you
accomplish that goal?
- Thank you, Congressman, for the question.
The short answer is, I'm not aware of a specific
action or a--
- [Congressman Abraham] And I'm not either.
That's why I ask the question.
I'm not aware of any either.
- But I think what that does is it really points
to the importance of the study that we've commissioned
with the National Academy of Sciences because as you
and I think about this, we would both conjure up notions
of some really bad things that could happen in the hands
of people who don't need a lot of training
or a lot of equipment.
- It sounds like science fiction, but it's not, it's here.
- It does.
What we've asked the academy to do is kind
of separate the science fiction from the reality
and recognize what reality is today.
And help us to understand
the national security implications.
What is possible in the near term, in the midterm
and the long term, as well as to identify
what can we do about it?
We know that the first step is detection.
First of all, we gotta know we're under attack.
So we know that the laboratories are already thinking
about ways that we could detect a genetically modified
version of some disease.
So that's the starting point,
and we're already working on that.
But I really think the key to framing this,
framing the whole potential threat, is the national academy,
the national experts.
Thinking through this with the assembly
of the various stakeholders, Health and Human Services,
Homeland Security, and so forth.
And Department of Defense so that we can
wrap our arms around it.
- Is there anything we can do in Congress
to help you guys out?
- Not that I can think of right now.
I would tell you that
in the chem, bio, S and T world for science and technology,
one of our top priorities is finding an integrated
early warning system and process to do
just what Dr. Hopkins can talk about because
finding what is out there
and knowing it's coming is critical.
So I would expect our work would progress in that area.
- [Congressman Abraham] Anything to add Mr. Verga?
- [Mr. Verga] Nothing other than just I think
the recognition of the problem is the first step
towards dealing wit and I think it's important--
- [Congressman Abraham] I think we recognize that.
Thank you, Chairwoman, I yield back.
- [Chairwoman Stefanik] Mr. Veasey.
- Thank you, Madam Chair.
I had a question I wanted to ask you.
I know that on this committee that we've been closely
monitoring military readiness levels.
And I'd like to hear your assessment
of our current readiness levels dealing with chemical,
biological, radiological nuclear equipment
and personnel across the DOD and other agencies.
And any of you can answer that.
- Thank you, Congressman.
For the traditional agents and threats
that we've been,
mustard, nerve,
chemicals, known biological systems,
I believe that the investments that the Department's
been making for decades in masks, suits, gloves,
individual protection, collective protection,
and all of those areas have provided a certain degree
of readiness, an added degree of readiness,
for encountering those classical agents.
In the area of emerging threats,
emerging infectious diseases,
synthetic biology, engineered diseases,
I don't think we know how good we are or how bad we are,
and that's an area where we are focusing
and we have to continue to focus.
- I also wanted to switch to
Middle East and north Africa
and wanted to ask if you could discuss
how the current events there are impacting
DTE, RAs, operations, and planning.
And have you received any additional requests
for support from CENTCOM and AFRICOM,
and what are some of your largest concerns there?
- So, obviously it's a military campaign against ISIS
continues in Iraq and Syria, ISIS is regrouping,
specifically in those areas of the Middle East
and north Africa.
DTRA works with partner countries in those regions
to help contain and reduce those threats from terrorists
that are obtaining WMD materials
that could certainly destabilize those regions
and lead to large refugee flows.
In countries where there's active ongoing violence,
such as in Iraq, our CTR operations have been
curtailed significantly.
And our engagements have been limited to VTC instead of
being able to go there in person.
In countries where violence is sporadic
and the security situation is delicate,
such as in Lebanon and Jordan,
our CTR operations have continued
to provide the security environment.
That environment is stable enough for our operations.
But we've encountered delays.
But they've been short in duration.
So our, in essence, our work there has been limited
because we're always focused on the safety of our people
before we send them over there.
And so that limits us of what we can do.
- Thank you very much.
And wanted to also ask one more question related to Ebola.
You know, we had one of the more high profile cases
in Dallas County, which is an area that I represent.
And wanted to know what lessons that you feel we've learned
that have been put into practice?
And how would you assess the DOD's ability to respond
similarly in future cases?
- I'll comment on that.
First thing, I think what DOD brings to a situation
like the Ebola outbreak is, pardon me,
our organizational ability, our planning ability,
our logistics, and those sorts of things.
I think we learned from the Ebola outbreak the necessity
of having the capacity to transport folks.
We made an investment in the patient transportable
pods that can be put into our military medical evacuation
aircraft to do things like that.
But I think the primary thing is early detection.
I think the earlier we can recognize
that is what the problem is,
and the earlier we can get ahead
of the curve on the trying to deal with the problem
is probably where we're at.
So I think our efforts in early detection and warning
of outbreaks is probably where our best investment
can be made.
- Thank you.
Madam Chair, I yield back.
- Mr. Wilson.
- Thank you, Chairwoman Stefanik.
And thank each of you for being here today
on these important issues.
And, indeed, our subcommittee
has been very fortunate to have a Sandia fellow,
Katie Sutton, here.
In fact, she brings good news and bad news.
Last year, she brought bad news.
But it needed to be addressed.
And her professionalism has certainly come through.
Last year, we had the mishandling
of the live anthrax samples that were sent from Dugway
to 86 government and private labs and other facilities
in the United States and seven other countries.
Australia, Britain, Canada, Germany,
Italy, Japan, and Ssouth Korea.
Mr. Verga, what is the status of the report requested
in FY17NDAA regarding the mishandling
of the anthrax shipment?
What is the status of any corrective actions
that have been put in place to make sure this type
of incident is prevented in the future?
And what efforts are being taken within the Department
to reduce the amount of select agent number
of labs that handle select agents.
And this can be answered really by anyone,
but if you would begin.
- I'm afraid I would have to get back to you on that
because I don't know the details.
But I will provide that to you.
- [Congressman Wilson] Ms. Durand, Dr. Hopkins?
- On the status of the report,
I'll have to get that answer for you.
If I could take that for the record,
I'll get that status.
As far as what the Department's done,
we recognized as a result of those inadvertent shipments
that the handling of those agents was being done
in different chains of command.
And there was not unity of effect or unity
of oversight over the years.
And so, one of the things,
I think the most significant thing
that the deputy secretary did is he designated the secretary
of the Army is the executive agent for all work
with biological select agents.
And that has had a unifying effect,
and it has introduced a certain amount of discipline
into the process.
They're responsible for reviewing
and inspecting all of the laboratories
that handle biological select agents and toxins.
And they've also looked outside themselves.
They've gone to establish an expert panel
to review the procedures,
such as the ones that didn't work at Dugway.
So I think we're in much better shape
we were two years ago on this,
primarily because of that action.
There have been a number of actions below that in order
to introduce more discipline
and care at the laboratory level.
But I think the most significant thing was
establishing the secretary of the Army
as the Department's executive agent for overseeing
all work with those select agents.
- I have nothing further to add.
- I, again, Katie Sutton was just terrific.
Bringing this to our attention, monitoring this.
Her professionalism always comes through.
And we're gonna miss here as she departs
for another great assignment.
Additionally, for Ms. Durand, Dr. Hopkins,
the FY17 supplemental budget request included
a supplemental increase of $127 million
for the chemical demilitarization program due
to engineering challenges and increased contract cost.
Can you explain the justification
for this additional request?
What is the impact if this funding is not received?
Will the program be able to complete all required
destruction by the 2023 deadline?
What mitigation steps are being put in place
for this program to prevent further cost
and schedule overruns?
- Thank you, Congressman, for that question.
Just for some context on this.
The chemical demilitarization program in the United States
is working on eliminating the last 10%
of what the United States declared
to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
That would be we declared 30,000 tons several years ago,
and this Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives program
is the program that has the two sites,
one in Kentucky, one in Colorado.
And there has been major progress at both of those sites.
In Pueblo, they've started operations.
In Bluegrass, they're going to systemization.
There is a request in the supplemental
for additional resources.
And that is primarily to recover some schedule
in order to make sure that we make the 2023.
And, actually, in large scale processes like these,
the more we can invest upfront,
the higher the likelihood that it's gonna reduce
the life-cycle cost for this.
The need for the increase was really due
to a number of factors.
Primarily, we did not anticipate the fact
that the first-of-a kind technologies that are being used
at both locations would require so much rework.
And I could go into gory detail on some of the things,
like redoing welds and so forth.
But in both cases, in both Pueblo and in Bluegrass,
there has been unexpected,
unplanned need for some additional rework
in order to get the systems up and running.
And when I say we didn't anticipate, I can be very specific.
We didn't anticipate last year.
Because last year, in an attempt to reduce the amount
of money that the program carried over from one year
to another, the Aqua program gave money back,
returned money, so that it could be rephased
in the out years.
And so, as a result, at the same time we're
returning the money so that it can be rephased
in later years, the need for this rework,
the emerging challenges also appeared,
and that resulted in actual need for the money in '17.
So what we're essentially trying to do is put back
into '17 that we had reprogrammed in the out years
in order to make sure that we make the 2023 schedule.
- [Congressman Veasey] Thank you very much.
- Ms. Cheney.
- Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Thank you very much trial witnesses for being here today.
I wanted to dig a little deeper in terms
of what we're doing to protect our war fighters,
and in particular, the extent to which we're facing
increaseing threats on the ground in Iraq and Syria.
Mr. Verga, maybe we could start with you.
Just in terms of the assurances that you feel,
the confidence that you feel,
that we're in a position where we're providing our men
and women in uniform with the very best possible protection
against the growing threat that they may be facing
on the battlefield from these types of weapons.
- Well, we have a great deal of confidence in the
equipment and the training that our forces have
in order to deal with these threats.
I mean, it's one that we've recognized over time,
made significant investments in our ability
to counter those threats.
Excuse me, and are now working with our partners
and allies in the area to, in fact, provide to the allies,
to the Iraqis, and to the Kurds,
equipment through cooperative programs
that DTRA and Dr. Hopkins can speak
to a little bit more in detail
to be able to deal with those.
Again, I think the importance is recognizing the threat.
I mean, ISIS has in fact used both chemical weapons
and toxic industrial chemicals against our forces
and against our allied forces there.
I don't know if you had anything--
- Thank you.
In addition, we are making sure that our laboratories,
such as Edgewood in Maryland,
they actually do challenge our ability
to protect the war fighter with masks and suits and gloves.
We're making sure that the things that we're giving
the war fighters are effective against what we believe
to be the actual materials that are being used in the field.
- Just to add a little bit more.
And DTRA's specific role in the science piece of that
are chemical and biological folks get a lot of feedback
from the joint program office on how the development
that we did, how that's actually working.
Another great program that we have
is a Scientist in the Foxhole program.
And we take our scientists who are working
on the initial phases of developing that equipment
that will give the best protection to the war fighter.
We send those scientists out into the field
with the war fighter so they can get
that immediate feedback.
And that helps them tremendously in understanding
as they're doing their research and the scientific work
what works for the war fighter and what doesn't.
So that's proven to be very successful.
- And just to follow up,
in terms of the increasing capabilities
that we're facing from our adversaries in these areas,
could you provide a little bit of information
about the extent to which our technology and ability
to defend against what we're seeing
and the increasing availability of some of these weapons,
whether you feel that we're keeping up sufficiently
in terms of the progress that's being made by our enemy?
- My hesitation is, I'm trying to think if in an
unclassified format we can talk about where we are in that.
I think I would prefer to defer that because we couldn't get
into any real specifics.
- All right, that's fine. Thank you.
And then I just wanted to follow up on
where we are on the national biodefense implementation
and strategy?
I know you're gonna be coming back to us in September
of this year, but if you could talk a little bit
about sort of the preliminary work that's been done
and how you think things are going based
on the requirement in the last NDAA.
- Thank you.
Of course, the Department of Homeland Security is
leading that review.
We in the Department of Defense are cooperating with them
along with HSS and the Department of Agriculture
and many other organizations.
We did provide a briefing to staff on where we're at on it.
And, as you said, the report is due in September.
And we think we'll be able to deliver that on time.
- [Congresswoman Cheney] Thank you very much.
I yield back.
- Mr. Scott.
- Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ma'am, gentleman, thank you for your service
to the country.
And my question gets back to our interaction
with other countries that we may not
necessarily share values with but we share interests with.
Obviously, the country of Russia comes to mind.
Russia and the United States,
we're key to getting Syria
to destroy their chemical weapons.
How much dialogue do you have with
counterparts in other countries about what the most
pressing threats are and the most efficient ways
to eliminate those threats?
- I would describe the interactions we have
with our allies and friends as robust.
We have--
- If I may, I'm also talking about people that we don't
consider to be allies or friends,
but that we may have a shared interest with
in this particular field.
- Yeah, I'd have to check on that one, sir.
I'm sorry, I don't have that right off hand.
- I'd be interested in your answer if you think
that perhaps that's something that we should pursue.
If you would then, go ahead with our allies and friends,
if you would.
- With our allies, we do have a robust cooperative program
with them, cooperative research and development programs.
Working very closely with particularly our NATO allies
and also others to be able to share information
regarding the threats and regarding the countermeasures.
I know Dr. Hopkins can talk a little bit more
about some of the specific programs.
- Yes, in addition to the sharing information
about the potential threats, we have very active
detailed engagements with our closest allies
on mitigations and identifying ways to protect us
and especially in the NATO scenario where we actually
have a common standard for the performance
of various countermeasures.
So closest allies, very strong
and very effective, helpful to us.
- I would be interested in your comments, as well,
all of your comments about whether or not this is something
that we should look in to,
whether we should or should not potentially share
information with countries where we have
that shared interest, if you will,
even though we don't share values.
I know the issue with Syria, for example,
is one where it took an agreement with Russia
to actually get those weapons destroyed.
But with that, Madam Chair,
I'll look forward to the written response,
and thank you for your service to the country.
And I yield back the remainder of my time.
- Thank you, we'll now go to second round
of questions for members who are able to.
My question is a follow-up, Ms. Durand,
to Mr. Veasey's line of questioning.
In your testimony, you highlighted DTRA's
growing activities in the Middle East and northern Africa,
both in the context of support
to operation inherent resolve
and the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.
But can you discuss how DTRA prioritizes
which nations receive support?
And how does DTRA leverage other government
agencies in these efforts?
- Again, thank you.
A lot of our priorities come from the two offices
that Mr. Verga and Dr. Hopkins represent.
So the priorities flow from the Department of Defense
down through the office of the secretary of defense.
In our own internal planning for our priorities,
we have a lot of interaction
with the combatant commands.
So we get a lot of our priority input from them.
We have our own robust strategic planning process
within the agency and determining
what are the greatest threats?
What are those priorities?
And then as we build our budgets we focus on those.
But all those are fed through other avenues
throughout the Department.
- And then how does DTRA leverage
other government agencies in these efforts?
- So that part is critical to us.
We have very robust partnerships
across the interagency.
There are various things that the Department of State
does with us related to the
Cooperative Threat Reduction program.
We've mentioned before, Health and Human Services.
They do a lot of work.
So we are constantly coordinating and synchronizing
and making sure that no one is duplicating efforts.
And, in essence, it ends up being a leveraging
of capabilities across the entire government
so everyone knows where their lanes are,
and they can focus on those,
their specific areas of expertise.
- It is clear that there are growing needs of support.
And what are your concerns about the growing need
for this support?
In the region.
- Can I take that one for the record?
- [Chairwoman Stefanik] Absolutely.
- Thank you.
- I will recognize Mr. Langevin
for his second round of questions.
- Thank you, Madam Chair.
Again, thanks to our witnesses.
Dr. Hopkins, as you know for the last two years,
I have followed the program Constellation.
And the program is being resourced by the office
of the secretary of defense and executed by DTRA
to fulfill a STRATCOM requirement.
Although I must say it's worth noting,
our committee never heard a director from STRATCOM
in this particular need or program,
which I found curious.
But now that the CWMD synchronization role
has transferred from STRATCOM to SOCOM.
How is the department clarifying situational awareness
requirements of that command?
- Thank you for the question.
It's especially timely.
As you probably could tell from the testimony,
we have discontinued the prototype
that was called Constellation
primarily due to the limitation of funds
that was in the NDAA draft and in the final language.
Having said that, though,
the requirement for situational awareness
is as strong or stronger than it ever has been.
The commander of SOCOM has said more than once
that he has a very firm, strong need
for a common intelligence and common operating pictures.
And that is the essence of what situational awareness is.
And that's it essence of what the Constellation
prototype was intended to provide.
Two things are happening.
One is your language in the NDAA basically
asked us to have an independent look
at the system, the requirements, and the plans,
and we're doing that.
We've hired a federally funded research
and development company to go ahead
and objectively look at requirements,
including the ones that you referenced
might have come from STRATCOM at the time.
But the requirements for all the combatant commanders
for situational awareness of WMD related things.
And our plan is to take the resources that we have.
And any future resources,
and work with STRATCOM and work with DTRA,
and adapt those parts of,
that way we did learn the special, useful things
from the Constellation and adapt them
to the common intelligence
and the common operating picture that SOCOM needs
in order to perform their function at the synchronizer.
So we're in the process of doing that.
We'll get the requirements and the plans.
It's work with the FFRDC.
And then also adapt what we have directly
to the needs of the combatant commander.
- So how under resourced were you
for the program that you had to cancel it?
- Trusting me memory here, about $25 million.
- So are you saying that you're coming up
with a replacement program constellation-like,
or is it a?
- I don't know what we'd call it yet.
We're looking at the requirements,
and we're gonna work with SOCOM and DTRA
to understand what would be the most useful
and helpful ways to obtain and depict
situational awareness of people, places, and things
in the various theaters having to do
with weapons of mass destruction.
What would most useful to the war fighter in the field?
And what form that takes, I'm not quite sure yet.
But we did learn a lot from doing the Constellation.
So the plan this year is to use the funds
we have to do that, and then recovering next year,
and then investing in more in those things
that are useful to SOCOM.
- Okay, well we know that the requirement hasn't gone away.
- It's the funding that's the program.
- [Dr. Hopkins] Correct, sir.
- Thank you.
Mr. Verga, what process is the Department using
to ensure the transition of necessary resources
from STRATCOM to SOCOM for the CWMD mission?
Has the hiring freeze impacted the ability of SOCOM
or DTRA to bring people in to keep positions
during the transition?
And for Ms. Durand.
How has transition been for DTRA?
What have been the challenges and opportunities identified?
So, Mr. Verga.
- To my knowledge, there has not been any issues
that have been identified by SOCOM
as far as the transition goes.
I know they had their initial operational capability
in January to do that.
And as far as I know, they're moving right along.
The normal budgetary process in terms of transferring
of resources is the one that we're using.
If I could take this opportunity.
I may have misspoke when I was talking about ISIS use
of chemical weapons.
I believe I may have said that they had used them
against U.S. forces, that's not true right now.
Right now it's only be Iraqi civilians
and Iraqi forces that they have
used chemical weapons against.
And I'd like to correct that, if I could.
Thank you.
- So for the transition from STRATCOM to SOCOM,
I will address how it has impacted DTRA.
First, I will say our relationship with SOCOM is tremendous.
We've had a long-standing relationship with them.
And that has grown even stronger.
Last December, General Thomas gathered up
the entire interagency and DOD members and talked about,
got their input for his overall plan.
So he learned from that.
We had a global synchronization conference last month
and bringing in all the interagency.
He laid out his initial thoughts on the global campaign plan
that he is developing,
and he was gaining everyone's input on that.
So that has been going very well.
Specifically to the agency under STRATCOM,
the director of DTRA was dual-hatted
as the director of STRATCOM Center
for Countering WMD.
SOCOM is not following that organizational model,
which is just fine.
We still have most of the same people within the agency.
So they are the SOCOM element with us.
And that partnership is continuing, and they're really,
if anything, it's grown even stronger with General Thomas's
and his entire staff's active participation in that.
So I will tell you I think it is going exceptionally well.
- Very good. Thank you.
I have other questions that I'll submit for the record.
And if you could respond to those in writing,
I'd appreciate it.
Thank you. I yield back.
- Thank you Mr. Langevin.
And thank you so much to all of our witnesses.
Dr. Hopkins, Mr. Verga, and Ms. Durand
for your expertise and testimony today.
And no further questions from the committee members?
I adjourn this hearing. (gavel pounds)
-------------------------------------------
The Isle | NEW MODELS FOR MAIA AND DRYO, SWIMMING IS BACK!| #74 [Early Access] - Duration: 16:37.
New models for Maia and Dryo. :)
Yeey! I can swim :O
I feel so good!
My legs are so funny c:
Oh, there is a Puerta!
Bon appetit :P
Should I try it? >:D
*bungee jumping*
I believe i can swim!
OMG? what is this?
I have no animation...
What's up? ;)
Oh, there is a giga OvO
I'm not here :X
I'm a small stone.
He still watching me 0_0
Oh, c'mon you make me nervous.
OH F*CK!
Time to run!
F*ck f*ck OvO
He still chasing me!!!
Go away, buddy!
I can pretend I'm this tree >:}
Oh, poor baby Rex :c
This guy is evil.
I'm here with Sovicka! :P
and there are friendly herbivores. ^0^
A dryo?
I heard him o,o
YEY! we are so cool. ^0^
Hello ^-^
How's going? ;D
Jesus anky?
Omg! Oreo cookie! xD
Haha, we're strange pack. xD
Utah, you don't like oreo cookie? :C
Oh guys? I feel so alone here.
Mmm... I like the wood noise :D
What's going on here?!
They're fighting! :O but why?
The Albino spino is the winner!
The Puerta is noodle now :D
OMG! Stegy!
Are you okay? :D
Ok! now It's my turn >:D
Let's swim with this dino! ^0^
Omg It's like a doggie!
But... I'm underwater ._.
Sovicka! :O watch out!
Ok. I think he's friendly c:
What the hell? three allos?
Omg it's so crazy here! o_o
I need to go away...
Omg they're joined. :D
What the!?
This world is insane! :D
OMG?! where did you came from?! :D
You scared me! D:
This place is so beautiful <3
Angelka is here!
OMG she's gone now! :C
Evil sucho!
Come here you ....! >:O
*revenge*
Here are an Allo plantations xD
Let's fight for fun! :P
I am the winner!
But it's more I can take :c
-------------------------------------------
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For more infomation >> How to Draw and Coloring Funny Crab Colouring Videos for Kids with Colored Markers Funny Cartoons - Duration: 10:22. -------------------------------------------
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Best Android Screen Recorder - Best and Free Screen/Game Recorder For Android | No Root | - Duration: 2:55.
Best Android Screen Recorder
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