(pensive, midtempo music)
- Hi, everybody.
I want to welcome you to this wonderful occasion,
a very special occasion.
This is the first in the Lee Rainwater lecture series.
My name is Tim Smeeding; I'll tell you who I am in a minute,
but first of all I want to thank Janet and Mary Waters
for doing the organization.
If you want anything organized, get Janet,
and if you want to do anything at Harvard
and have the facilities and everything ready, go to Mary.
I know all the life lessons,
and her staff, Janet will mention.
I want to thank our good friend and colleague Robert Erikson
for coming to speak, and the rest of you
for coming out in the rain.
Thank you very much, and I hope you enjoy it.
What we're gonna have now is a 30-minute short program
of remembrance of Lee.
I must say, I met Lee in 1983 and he said,
"Some people said you'd be crazy enough to go over
"to Luxembourg and try and build this data project,"
and I said, "Well, we'll give it a try,"
and for the next 23 years, we built something
called the Luxembourg Income Study.
Along the way, I got to know him, his brilliance, his quiet.
You will hear somebody say, if they don't say:
"Lee was the brains and Tim was the engine,"
pretty much, of LIS.
Anyway, we built this Luxembourg Income Study,
which we've given to Janet now,
and Janet has done amazingly well,
has built it up, has two offices.
She's got Paul Krugman on her team,
she's got Branko Milanovic, she's got 62 countries,
and Phil is really happy, so there.
But Lee was also a co-author.
He was a father figure to me.
When my dad passed away in '88,
Lee and I had long talks about that.
He was a tutor, and he taught me to drink wine, not beer;
I'm always grateful for him for that,
(audience chuckles)
and two years ago, my university gave me
a WARF named distinguished professorship,
and I could pick the name of anybody I wanted.
So me, the economist and public-policy type, decided
that I would be the Lee Rainwater Distinguished Professor
of Public Policy and Economics, and it reminds me everyday
when I look at that little signature block
how much Lee meant to me and how close I was to him.
So we're really happy you could be here.
I made my quota.
Jan, am I on time?
Good, phew.
Now, I want to introduce, for those of you
who don't know it, this is Carol Rainwater,
who was always Lee's partner.
She would even come to Luxembourg now and then,
you can see her in the t-shirts up there,
(laughs) and dressed better than that.
She wants to greet you all as well,
and then we'll go from there.
Carol.
- I didn't realize that I would have an excuse
for not being able to talk well by being hit in the head.
(audience laughs)
And instead, I was gonna tell you
that if there weren't so many people here who know me,
I would say that the dog ate my notes.
It wasn't the dog, it was my printer
which went on the fritz.
I just am so pleased that this is taking place,
and I thank the sponsors of this occasion,
the Department of Sociology at Harvard,
and the Stone Center On Socio-Economic Inequality
at CUNY Graduate Center and the home of LIS.
It's thanks to them that this is taking place today.
Mary Waters and the department staff
have helped Janet so much in taking care of the details
in preparing for today.
Certainly, she and her staff in New York at CUNY
had plenty to do.
I thank Suzanne and Odette for all they've done,
but I have a question.
Why didn't you do something about the weather?
(audience chuckles)
Before there was LIS, before Lee was at the Department
of Sociology or at Harvard or at Washington University,
there was Social Research Incorporated
and the University of Chicago.
Lee and I met in 1956 when I went to work
in the administrative staff at SRI,
but actually; I don't know, did he make it or not?
I guess he hasn't been able to come.
I was hoping that today there was going to be another person
who had known Lee even longer, even before I did,
and that was Robert Weiss, who was a student with Lee
at the University of Chicago. (audience chuckles)
Oh, there he is!
Hey.
Hi, Bob; thanks for coming.
There's another person who was at Chicago
and who worked with Lee and me at Social Research,
and he, Gerald Handel, could not make it,
he and his wife Ruth, but their son Michael Handel
is here today, and many of you know that he was also
a graduate student at the Department of Sociology here.
Thank you, Michael, for representing our dear friends.
When we lost Lee, Janet was in Luxembourg,
Tim was in Paris with Marcy, his wife Marcy Carlson,
and their adorable little boy Finny, on sabbatical,
but that did not stop them from giving us
every bit of support they could possibly give.
They were wonderful.
Janet, with the help of Dan Cahill,
had put together the most beautiful film,
a film that recognized Lee and his work,
and was sent out to colleagues all over.
Then, they just kept doing things,
coming to see us here, Katherine and myself,
and I must say that they helped so much
in making things easier for me and for my children,
Katherine and Jon Rainwater,
and Jon's wife Susan Stephenson.
It was really great.
As Tim pointed out, when given the opportunity,
he named his professorship at Wisconsin after Lee,
and that was also terrific.
Within a few months, after Lee's death,
Janet and Tim contacted me and said they got this idea
to put together annual lectures that would memorialize Lee
and recognize his work.
Of course, I was delighted, and once they had
thought through it a bit, they started to contact people,
colleagues of Lee's and friends of Lee's,
who would make donations to holding these events,
and the response from these people was immediate
and generous, and I thank them for that.
I want to say, as I look out as this audience
and see colleagues of Lee, dear friends
from all different groups and individuals,
I'm talking about Daisy Chain, the Mermaids,
and all of these wonderful friends,
I thank you so much for being here.
But again, I want to thank the sponsors, contributors,
Robert for coming here.
Oh, I do want to say one thing about Robert.
There could be no better person
to give the first lecture than Robert.
He was there with Lee long before LIS started,
you just pointed out to me it was before, not during.
He shared data from Sweden at the very outset
and has been there for Lee and Tim, now for Jan,
and it's wonderful that he is our speaker today.
And most of all, I want to thank
Janet and Tim.
(smooches kiss)
(chuckles)
(audience applauds)
- Thank you very much Carol.
I'm Mary Waters and I'm the chair
of the Sociology Department,
and I want to welcome everybody here
on behalf of the Sociology Department.
I want to thank our fantastic staff,
especially Suzanne Ogungbadero and Odette Binder,
who have done so much work to put everything together
so nicely for us today.
I wanna just say a few words;
many of my colleagues who knew Lee and who never met Lee
are here today to join with us in remembering him
and thinking about the issues that he thought were important
with Bob's talk.
I wanted to just say a few words about Lee
and our department.
Lee taught in the Sociology Department
from 1969 'til 1992, when he retired.
He had an illustrious career, and as I thought
about Lee's career, I thought about what makes us
such a successful and, really, terrific department
to work in and to train students, and I realized
that Lee personified many of the things
and actually did many of the things before his time,
that now are spreading throughout the nation
but that harvard was one of the first to do,
and I would just mention one or two of them.
One is that our department is well known,
and we've been recruiting potential graduate students
the last few weeks, and so I've been talking up
the department, and so I've realized
that everything I've been stressing about our department,
really, Lee personifies.
One is that we train our students equally
in qualitative and quantitative research
and believe that the method is important
for asking a particular question,
and that you're not assigned to one or the other
of these things, which of course,
Lee did throughout his career.
We are an empirical department and a department
that really thinks about the real world,
and also, the implications for policy.
Many of our faculty and graduates students think about that,
and of course, Lee was a trailblazer for that.
I think about Lee's teaching, and when I first came in 1986
as a new assistant professor, I was told
by some of the other professors that Lee's course,
which was one class and on poverty and on the working class,
attracted, overwhelmingly, students who were the first
in their families to go to college,
and it was one of the few classes where they saw themselves
and they got to think about their own trajectories,
and he was really appreciated by students for that,
and we still pride ourselves
in attracting those kinds of students.
And finally, the topics that Lee devoted his life to.
Poverty, inequality, comparative research,
urban research, race, and public policy
are all things which are all very strong in our department,
among other things that we specialize in,
but that he really set an agenda
that really lives on, and lives on in our students,
and we're just very proud to have been the place
where Lee did a lot of his important research,
and we're happy to celebrate that with you today.
Thank you.
(audience applauds)
- Thank you so much.
I'm Janet Gornick, now Professor of Political Science
and Sociology at the Graduate Center
at the City University of New York.
Again, thank you, everybody, thank you for coming;
I think we've heard all this, and again,
I do want to thank especially Suzanne and Odette,
who Mary lent to me as we were getting organized.
I myself also knew Lee well, he was a big figure in my life.
I met Lee in the 1970s when I was an undergraduate here,
but I encountered him again in 1989
when I was his teaching assistant.
He was teaching a class at the Kennedy School,
where I had been affiliated and I was a PhD student here
by then, and he turned to me one day and said,
"I need to hire somebody to build a social-policy database,"
for LIS, which I had just learned about,
it was five years old at the time.
He described the job to me and I said,
"That sounds interesting."
It was a part-time research job.
We were standing at the Kennedy School
and he asked me when I could relocate.
I said, "Oh, is this job at William James?"
And he said (chuckles), "The job is in Luxembourg."
I said, "Where is Luxembourg?" (audience chuckles)
Tim tells the same story, I wasn't sure
if it was Lichtenstein or somewhere a little, anyway.
I ran home and looked on the atlas,
that's what you did in those days,
and I thought, "That looks interesting."
So I came back the next day and I said okay.
I finished my exams here and I moved to Luxembourg
where I stayed almost two years, and thus, for me,
began the rest of my life.
So that one exchange with Lee,
and then he chaired my dissertation,
and that one exchange with Lee shaped my entire career
of 27 years so far.
Lee retired, Harvard rules said he could no longer
chair the dissertation, so in stepped Chris Winship,
thank you, who I would say, how do I say this politely?
He kicked my butt, which was not Lee's style,
for those of you who knew Lee, and told me to hurry up
and finish, which I did very quickly.
So he scared the heck out of me and I finished really fast,
and I thank you, Chris, as well.
Okay, so that's that.
I have been involved with LIS all those years;
Tim was director for 23 years, I was director for 10,
and we've just recently reorganized.
Let me tell you what we're gonna do.
I'm determined to keep us on schedule.
I wanna say just a couple of words about the lecture series,
you have a program in front of you,
and as Carol mentioned, several people very quickly
and very generously donated.
We have in hand money for about eight years,
so we'll start calling you in about five years
if we get a little panicky, Tim and I'll start calling you.
But people gave very generously.
What we decided to do was alternate the lecture each year
between here, because it was Lee's home for so long
and also mine for a long time, and the Graduate Center
at the City University of New York,
where Phil Kasinitz has come today also
to wave the CUNY flag and represent
the sociology program there, which also gave.
So we'll announce in the fall the date and the new speaker,
the donors are the selection committee,
and we will certainly keep going for the next many years,
and we hope that the Rainwaters will join us
in New York each year.
Okay; the next thing we're gonna do,
we've left just 10 minutes for this.
Carol made reference to a video, and in fact,
the video was made in 2011, but of course,
what you're remembering is right after Lee died,
we recirculated it, and at that point we were tweeting
and all the new things that we can do
to put things out in circulation.
What we decided to do back in around 2008 or 2009
was to capture the story of the founding of LIS,
because it really was unusual.
It doesn't seem as unusual,
Sherri Minton is nodding, by the way,
she was a big part of our LIS life as well.
So when LIS was founded, it was an extraordinarily
revolutionary project, for everybody involved,
and it was unusual for Luxembourg,
which does not have a research community
to welcome this marvelous little project,
and there were six people who really put it together.
One of them was Lee, and one was Gaston Schaber,
and Tim, and then three others.
In any case, Dan Cahill, who's doing the video today,
and I interviewed these six people, which I think took us
to four countries and many hours,
we have about 6 1/2 hours of video,
we're only behind the camera, and we turned it
into this short story of the founding of LIS,
and so I want to show you 10 minutes of it today.
I hope it's linear enough,
I just chose a few clips the other day.
You will see Lee talking, I gave Carol a warning,
I didn't want anybody to be too surprised to see Lee up here
and speak, but Lee will tell an anecdote, actually,
about how thrilled he was with the technical side of LIS,
which Sherry Minton was really deeply part of.
I'll just say this right now, I don't think this line,
it's not in the excerpt, but it's in the longer video.
Back in the 1980s, I guess Lee was sitting in his office
writing computer code and sending it up to the server
on the 11th floor, am I right?
Is that how?
The 13th floor.
So, the way the story was told, at some point,
and this is probably apocryphal, I'm not sure,
Sherri, you can tell people later,
was at some point, what was said was,
"If he can sit in his office," on the sixth floor?
Fifth floor?
I should have prepared for this, right?
"If he could sit on the fifth floor
"and send his runs up to the 13th floor,
"why couldn't he send them to Luxembourg?"
And thus was born our remote-execution system
which made us world-famous.
So, that's what happened.
I'm gonna show you just 10 minutes
and then I'll just take three seconds to introduce Robert,
the absolute perfect choice for this lecture,
as I think you'll see, also, from this video.
- [Narrator] In the late 1970s, the American sociologist,
Lee Rainwater, became acquainted with Gaston Schaber,
a Luxembourgish psychologist.
Gaston directed a research institute in Luxembourg
known as CEPS.
He also held a faculty position at Clark University
in Western Massachusetts.
Gaston and Lee came together again
in August of 1982, at a conference on poverty
that was held at Clark University.
The Swedish sociologist Robert Erikson was also there,
as were several other European
and American social scientists.
Participants at the Clark conference discussed the idea
of creating a cross-national project
that would enable high-quality comparative research.
Those conversations led to the launch
of the Luxembourg Income Study in 1983 in Luxembourg.
Three people who were involved from its inception,
Lee Rainwater, Robert Erikson, and Tim Smeeding,
remember LIS' beginnings.
Three others who helped LIS to take root and develop,
Serge Allegrezza, Marc Cigrang, and John Coder,
also contribute their early memories.
- I knew Gaston because he had looked me up
because he had asked a colleague at Clark
who in the Cambridge area was concerned
with problems of poverty?
That was Tamara Hareven, who was a professor of history
at Clark, and she invited me to dinner to meet Gaston.
And then Gaston invited me up to Luxembourg
a couple of times, if I remmber correctly, just to talk,
or in one case, to listen in on a conference he had
of the people from the different poverty studies in Europe.
So when he presented the idea to me,
and to Marty Rhine, who was with me,
he said he would like to have a conference at Clark,
bring his people from Europe over,
and meet with some Americans who did poverty research.
- My first meeting with Lee was in the 1960s.
Lee came to Stockholm in order to use
the level-of-living study from 1968.
From that on, we had quite a lot of contact.
I had a long experience of Lee as an excellent sociologist
and a good person.
Gaston I only met at the first, what would we say, meeting
where LIS was more or less decided upon
without being formally established
here at Clark University in Massachusetts.
I didn't meet Gaston before that.
- We talked back and forth, he had his own crew
from Luxembourg, and he knew the people
who had done other poverty studies in Europe
for this European Union project.
But he didn't know anything about the work that was done
in Scandinavia on levels of living, so I told him
about Sten Johansson and Robert Erikson,
and pointed out they represented a different way
of going at this than the people he was working with,
particularly in Luxembourg, and I gave him the names
of poverty researchers from the Poverty Institute.
- Lee was the one who had the ideas of looking
at income inequality, looking at comparative studies
of income inequality to have the basis for doing that.
I think that all that, I think,
was clearly Lee's contribution.
So I think that if one should really point at somebody
who is the father of LIS, it is Lee Rainwater.
- I'll never forget the first time
I put in a whole bunch of runs, and just seeing them
roll off the printer with all of those countries,
I think maybe we had nine countries by that time,
was very, very exciting, and then the fact
that once the Internet got going, and email,
the fact that this could become a totally automatic process
was also very exciting, at least for me.
Lots of people treat those issues as,
"Well, I hope it works, and if it does work, good,"
but they weren't really interested
in the nuts and bolts of it.
That was an extra bonus in a way,
a non-social-science bonus from building the project.
- Altogether, the idea was that we were in this together,
we were trying to learn from each other,
we realized that we're providing customers with something,
and we kept, I think, to the model I set back in 1988,
which was work hard, play hard.
We were sincere about helping people
and I think that reputation has carried us to this poitn.
- In the early time when this was started,
comparisons of income data was just based
on what was produced by the governments,
and what the governments produced were,
of course, not comparable.
This was, I think, the most important aspect,
and this is the intellectual achievement.
To see both that it had to be done, and it could be done,
which I think is a piece of intellectual,
shall we say, courage.
- The great event of my life, one of them, anyway:
in September 2008, the University of Stockholm offered me,
and I received, an honorary doctorate
for the work I'd done with LIS.
I was just absolutely amazing, totally blown away.
Me, an honorary degree?
I had a wonderful time, and I'll always have fond memories
and a special place in my heart for LIS.
Lee and I are really proud of what we started,
and even prouder of what's being grown out of it.
- To be president of LIS, I must say,
was only for one period a hard work.
Otherwise, since this was a project
that was following exactly the ideas I had
about how comparative work should be done,
or rather, what the infrastructure for comparative work
should look like, in that respect, I was very happy
of being president of a nice institute.
- So, I guess in the end, we were lucky.
I think we did well because of hard work
and because of luck, and because I had Lee as a partner
and now Janet and Markus after us,
because we've had loyal employees
and because they're just really good people,
so I'm thankful.
Lee, I think at his retirement, said,
"This must be the most important thing I've done."
He thought that.
Now, this is Lee Rainwater, who's done a lot (chuckles)
of really important work, in case you didn't understand
what ghettoes were about in the '60s, '70s,
and '80s and so forth.
So, Lee could claim fame to a bunch of other stuff.
Not me.
Best thing I will ever do, have done, is LIS,
and I'm really proud of what we accomplished, again,
and where the project's going.
- It's now my pleasure to introduce Robert Erikson;
I think you can see why we were very grateful
that he agreed to give the first lecture,
'cause he's so integrally related to the project
and to Lee and so forth, and when I became
the director of LIS, 2006 to 2016,
Robert served as the board president
and a really crucial advisor for those five years.
So it's my great pleasure to welcome you.
- Okay, let me say that, as was clear from the video there,
that my first meeting with Lee, and with Carol, actually,
was around 1970.
I wonder if whether '69 was right, but never mind.
The point was that Lee came to Stockholm
because he was looking for new datasets and new ideas
how to look at inequality and poverty.
I would say as much I had followed him
during his career then, he stuck to that subject,
and wrote exactly about inequality and poverty.
This lecture is a small step behind him on inequality.
So, the idea is I should talk about social selection
in education and its consequences for mobility.
General intergenerational mobility is an immense area,
so if I should talk about it, I have to pick and select
what I should say; I can only take up a minor fraction
of the issues that come out.
What I will select, I will discuss social
rather than economic mobility, and I will emphasize
class mobility rather than status attainment,
which are on the one hand, the tradition in economics
and the other, the tradition in...
Two traditions in sociology,
and I dare to say that status attainment has been more done
here in the US, whereas class mobility has been done more
in Europe, so I thought coming here,
I should talk about class mobility.
Secondly, I will say this, that education
is the most important mechanism relating class origins
to class destinations.
That is, both for the means for children
from the more-advantaged classes to remain advantaged,
and it's a means for those from less-advantaged classes
to become better off.
So, I will then, given the importance of education,
I will start discussing how educational attainment depends
on social origins, and then discuss, too,
some aspects of the role of education in class mobility,
and where I will finally say a few words about the goal
to increase social mobility, and the possibility
to reach this goal by political measures.
In studies of the association between social background
and educational attainment, it was very early observed
that children from more advatnaged backgrounds
did, on average, perform better at school,
and also, given the performance at school,
they choose more academic lines of further education then.
This was shown by my old professor Bouwalt
who wrote his dissertation on this aspect, really, in 1947,
and Sandy Jencks over there had a paper,
I think it was in The Academic Mind,
where he also had this result.
So this was a...
Then it became, really, a major case in sociology
with the publication of the book by Raymond Boudon on...
I don't remember the name of the book,
but it was certainly on education
and the selection in education.
He called these two mechanisms,
the mechanisms that children do better at school
and therefore go further on:
the primary effect of social selection in education,
but there is also a direct effect that says
by other mechanisms than education
for the connection between social origins and destinations,
and that he called the secondary effect.
This has been established, so this is really
what we have to stick to, but it's slightly inconsequential
that the indirect effect from class origin
to class destination is called the primary effect,
and the direct effect from class origin
is called the secondary effect, but that is how it is.
It's not much we can do it.
It was really two French demographers,
Girard and Bastide, who really came up
with these two terms, but that was unknown to most of us,
because it was in a paper in French in demography.
Now, this pattern has been observed
in a very large number of countries.
In 2013, Michelle Jackson actually produced
an edited volume where you can see that pattern on this one.
We could summarize in the following way,
and I'll show it this way.
This is really a schematic picture of the whole process,
and that is, what you you have here,
you have two curves of grade-point averages
for girls, from the salariat, that is,
to upper professional and managerial fathers and mothers.
This is the grade distribution for girls
from the working class, and this is the grade distribution
for girls from the salariat.
It's a rather major difference between them.
The difference is of the size of a standard deviation
in the distribution here for girls from the working class.
I've taken just one example, given the girls
from leaving primary school at the age of 16,
and that's what it is about.
The other two curves, then, that is,
at this point, this is the point in Sweden
where the children have to divide, how to continue, right?
The crucial choice is whether you go to an academic line
in secondary school, or whether you go to a vocational line,
or perhaps just drop out.
What these two curves show,
I'll push to the right point, there, yes.
What these two curves show, they are estimates
of the probability of continuing on to the academic lines
in upper secondary school.
This curve is then the probability for girls
from the salariat, and this line is then the probability
for girls from the working class.
The difference here is rather great,
if you take somewhere in the middle here and you look,
the difference here is about 25%.
The girls from the workign class had a 25% higher chance
to go to the academic lines of upper secondary.
The combined effect
of these two effects...
You'll deal with them a little mathematically
and then you get the outcome
you increase or multiply the distribution
with the transition curve, which is, by the way,
estimated by a logistic regression.
Then, the girls from the salariat,
68% went on to acadameic lines of secondary school,
whereas 24% of the girls from the working class went on.
So it's a major difference, and it comes from both ways.
This was the point, this was what Bouwalt found,
it was what Boudon came out with,
that both effects here are operating.
You can say that the assumption behind this model
is that students, knowing their grades,
the grades are known to the students, of course,
before they decide where to go.
Knowing their grades, they have some information
about their potential, and then, on that basis,
they will decide.
But when we do it this way, we, with all probability,
underestimate the importance of choice here,
that is given by the two S-curves here.
Because if we assume that girls who, earlier in school,
decide that, "Yeah, I wanna go on to acadmics,"
they may work harder at school already,
so they may get better grades due to the choice
of continuing to upper secondary school.
So, we could try to look at another curve here.
Yes.
So, instead, in this dataset, we also have cognitive tests.
It's based on verbal, spatial, and numeric skills,
and it has all the qualities of the psychological scales
that you are used to.
So, here, we have really...
The distributions here are now the distributions
in this cognitive ability.
This is really Herrstein and Murray's bell curves,
this is precisely what it is.
And these, then, are the probabilities of the girls
choosing upper secondary school, given their grades.
Or sorry, given their cognitive ability.
And what we can see is that the difference
between the distributions of cognitive ability
and the distributions...
Sorry, the difference between the distributions
of cognitive ability are closer to each other, actually,
than the distribution of grades, which you can assume,
partly at least, is due exactly to these earlier decisions
of continuing that is more often probably taken by girls
from the salariat than from girls from the working class.
So here, we get, as you see, you get actually a larger,
in consequence, it will still give
exactly the same proportions, so it necessarily consequences
of these two distributions being closer to each other,
these will be more different.
If you look around, also, in somehwere in the middle,
the difference amounts to around 37 percentage points
between the girls from the two classes.
If you remember, it was 24% for given grades.
But in this case, the test results
are all unknown to the girls.
They are not...
So, in a sense, you can say
that the grades don't provide them with this security
or this information about their possible abilities
to continue to academics, and even if, of course,
those with very high cognitive ability
probably also got good grades, but like I said, of course,
there's a high correlation between them.
This does not provide thme the assuarance
that they will do well at upper secondary school.
And I would say, I didn't say it
but I could just, too, if we go back, it's worthwhile seeing
that at the ends of the distributions, either no one goes on
or at the top grades, everyone, both girls go on
to this academic lines of upper secondary school.
This doesn't really happen here, we got a larger difference.
Also, with the top cognitive ability,
there is not any difference of some importance.
But I could say like this:
this is an example for one group.
I could have chosen boys, I could have chosen
other cohorts, I could have chosen other countries,
other time periods, other transitions;
the picture would, in principle, be exactly like this.
It would be, of course, different;
the distributions would be different,
the transitions would be different, but the picture
would exactly stay this, and this is really the result
that we get, and that Michelle Jackson, in her book,
could show, that for all the countries in the world,
I think it was nine European nations plus the United States,
and they all come up with the same pattern, actually.
Okay.
Did I? No, okay.
Let me see, where am I.
Yeah.
Just to...
Okay, so, just to see another example,
I take the same test results, the distributions are,
of course, the same except for a few missing data,
whereas now we have the probability of getting
a university exam.
What we can see is that we get rather major difference
already, also at rather high cognitive ability,
between girls from the salariat and from the...
As I said, you can look at this in very many ways
and you can set it up.
For instance, one natural way to do it
is to look at only those who graduated
from the academic lines of upper secondary school
from where nearly all the university students come,
and you would get the same picture.
The two distributions would be pushed more together,
also the transitions would be closer,
but the picture would really look the same.
Stephen Morgan here, in the US, has pointed out
that this simple two-factor model, with primary
and secondary effects, cannot be regarded
as fully representing the cohortial mechanism...
Well, he particularly pointed out that here
in the United States, as he wrote,
race would be an important factor that should be involved
in the model.
He thought that this may not be so much of a problem
in Europe, but I think that with the increasing
ethnic diversity of the European nations,
we should certainly consider this factor as well.
But on the other hand, in spite of Morgan's critique
being quite valid, as I see it,
the model has some quite considerable heuristic value
for understanding the process, because it emphasizes
the importance of choice in educational continuation.
Particularly, you could say that it points out
that it's not only differences in ability and performance
that decides the educational careers of young people.
So I just wanted to show that was relating to choice,
which I thought would be interesting to present here,
because I never took it up in an international connection.
It was by a group of economists in Sweden in the 1990s,
and also their then-conservative government
came out and said that it may be...
The social selection in school has been an issue
that Swedish politicians have been at
since the 1940s at least, and they came out and said,
"Perhaps the social selection at school is because
"there is too little income inequality in Sweden."
And the argument is quite sensible, you see.
It says that while children
from more-advantaged backgrounds,
they will go on to university anyway,
but for the kids from the working class,
why should they take the risk of going to university
if there is not a substantial economic return to this fact?
So I think it's a sensible argument, but I still wanted
to test it, and Jon O. Jonsson and I tried to do that.
We started with the assumption that if children
from the working class are more influenced
by economic returns in their decision to continue
to higher education or not, it ought not only to concern
their choice of educational level, but it also concerns
what track to follow.
So we had access to a very large dataset
with detailed information on levels and fields of education.
And we could, for each combination of level and field,
or not each, but for many, we could set down
the average earnings of men; we took men in the ages
30 to 47, working full-time.
So for each of this educational groups,
we could apply a monetary value to it,
and the idea was then, of course, that if it was the case
that kids from the working class were more interested
in money, they ought to go for the educational combinations
or the educational tracks that gave the most money.
Then we had another dataset, of course, with younger people,
and we regressed the choice of educational track
in tertiary education, represented them by the money value
of that track on the grade-point averages from high school
on e square; we furthermore included sex,
parents' social class, parental education,
and the graduation line in academic secondary school,
which there are some differences.
So we had about 29,000 students from which we could look.
The groups from which we estimated the economic values
so to say, of the educational tracks,
I think it was 56 such groups,
and in no case we had less than 100 cases in a group
in order to have a fairly stable estimate
of the economic returns.
The first model accounted for 22% of the dependent value,
but there is one piece missing when we did this,
we thought, and that was the cost of the educational line.
So what we added to the model was the supposed length,
there was an established length of each educational track,
so we added that to the model.
We then came up to an r square of 0.45,
which is fairly decent, I would say.
In the end, then, we have it here.
I can't find the data any longer,
so I had to scan the picture of the paper
where we published it.
So what we have here is, here we have grades,
the grade-point average from the upper secondary school
before entering university; here we have this money value
of the educational tracks.
This is the managerial-and-professional class,
these are other non-manual, these are self-employed
and employers, and these are farmers and workers.
So the interesting case here is now,
those who chose the tracks paying,
were really the kids from upper-class backgrounds
or higher-class backgrounds.
You could perhaps assume that they knew how much it cost
to live the life they want to live.
So in this sense, what we could show by this paper
was that it really went against the idea
that kids from the working class were the ones
who went for the money when choosing education,
and I can, to my satisfaction here, say
that I never heard the argument mentioned
after this paper, actually.
(audience chuckles)
But why may it be that students
from more-advantaged backgrounds
choose the high-paying tracks, apart from this idea?
There is an idea from an excellent paper
by two American sociologists;
Keller and Zavalloni had a paper in Social Forces, 1964.
No, damn it, that was the wrong way; here we are.
This is a very schematic picture of their idea.
Here we have educational level, here we have
the subjective value of choosing that education,
and then we have two persons, say, two girls,
with different social background.
For both of them, the subjective value of more education
increases with the educational level.
But, and this was the idea by Keller and Zavalloni,
the subjective value of additional education
is less when you are past your aspiration level.
You can think of it like this, that if you compare
the assumed subjective value of becoming a certified nurse
for the daughter of a supermarket cashier
and for a physician, it's rather probable
that they value this education differently.
This, of course, is here.
At this point where, I suppose, the aspiration level
of the girl, say, from the workign class,
after that, it increases; still, more education
is still valuable, but the increase is not as sharp,
and this only happens for the other girl
when she reaches her aspiration level here,
and then, the assumption is that these two go on
where the slope is the same.
That is to say, we assume the same process,
and what is different is the situation
that defines the aspiration of the girls.
I think was, in my view, a very important paper
because at that time, it was the idea that the working class
didn't actually value higher education,
but here they assumed that the valuation is the same.
It's only the situation that differs.
I think it's a paper that could have been observed
more than it has, I think.
And the consequences, of course,
the value of a certain education is higher
for children from more-advantaged backgrounds.
So they have more reason to choose this type of education.
Okay, more generally, if we take the two mechanisms here,
you can say that differences in performance,
the primary effect, can be assumed to depend
on a combined effect of nature and nurture.
It's probable that kids from advataged backgrounds
from the start obtained relatively good cogintive
and non-cognitive skills, on the basis of the interaction
between genetics and environment, and this interaction,
I will say, I have great difficulties with these people
that come out and say that, "It's 80% that is genes,"
or, "It's 60% that is genes."
It's an interaction, and it starts
from the conception and onwards.
But I mean, parents with higher education
use a more elaborate vocabulary, which is probably part
of the explanation that their children, on average,
do clearly better on verbal tests, already,
at the age of three.
Children from the salariat, that they get
the cognitive advantage already at an early age,
of course, is to their benefit when they continue.
This is Heckman's idea of skill begets skill.
Furthermore, for this, children with salariat parents have,
presumably, conditions at home: more space, more books
that is to their advantage, leading to a better performance
to the primary effect.
To account for difference in choice
due the secondary effects, Jan O. Jonsson and I suggested
a very simple model.
We said that we have to consider the benefits
of the education, we should consider the cost
of the education, and we have to consider
the probability of success.
With some fiddling you come to a very simple model here,
saying the value or the utility
of choosing a certain education is dependent on the benefits
minus the costs, but the benefits are partly dependent,
they must be valued according to the probability
of succeeding in the education.
The idea of this model, it's a very simple thing,
and it's, again, a heuristic model,
because if you assume that these benefits in cost
are estimated as subjective values, you get difficult
if you wanna test it, but the point is
what we should look at, trying to understand
the educational choice of children from different classes.
It's a rather good argument that all three factors,
actually, are to the advantage of children
from higher origins.
They get more benefits, as we saw, for instance,
with the Keller-and-Zavalloni model,
they can take the costs much easier of higher education,
because they have the support from their parents,
or they can rely on the support from their parents,
I could say.
They also probably have a hgher probability of succeeding,
because of getting better guidance
from their parents, et cetera.
Breen and Goldthorpe has another testable model,
just looking at avoidance of downward social mobility
as important to avoid.
The avoidance of downward social mobility
will lead working-class kids go into vocational education
because that will offer them a good job,
and they don't run into the risk of if they go
into academic studies, they don't succeed,
the option of a vocational career
may not be open any longer.
So in that sense, this is...
And Jan and I also had some ideas in our paper
on this idea.
Breen and Goldthorpe, central in their model
is risk aversion, exactly this:
you avoid the risk of downward mobility.
The interesting case here, I think, is
both Keller and Zavalloni, and Breen and Goldthorpe, here,
are actually in line with Kahneman and Tversky
in their prospect theory, because what they all say
is that there are differences.
A loss like downward mobility weighs heavier than gain
in terms of...
And the Keller and Zavalloni, I think, is a very...
Kahneman and Tversky ought to have referred
to them, actually.
Okay.
So, just to say that...
What about, then, social mobility?
The simplest understanding of intergenerational
social mobility is the proportion of children who are
in another social class than their parents.
Children who are higher up have been upwardly mobile,
children who are further down have been downwardly mobile.
The rate of absolute mobility is, to a very large extent,
determined by the change of the social structure.
That is to say, in the earlier part of the previous century,
when industrial work increased
and work in farming decreased, children of farmers
and farm workers, with necessity, had to move
to industrial work or some other work,
but they had to leave their origin class,
which, of course, leads also then to absolute moility.
The same on what has been called, in some cases,
the golden age of social mobility in the '50s and the '60s,
when the upper salariat increased very quickly,
which opened more room at the top,
as some British dramatic wrote about it.
But what happens now is,
if, as it seems now, the social structure is changing less,
we seem to get a larger proportion
of low-skilled service jobs.
Absolute mobility will probably decrease,
and downward class mobility will probably, or may increase,
I could say.
So, differences between the distributions
of origin and destination are a major determinant
of absolute mobility.
The other major factor is social fluidity.
It refers to the inherent association
between the origin classes and the destination classes.
We can measure it so it's not dependent
on differences between the distributions
of origin and destination.
So you can say social fluidity refers
to an individual's probability of reaching one position
in the class structure rather than another,
in relation to the corresponding probabilities
of individuals from other social origins.
This relation is very close to a precise definition
of inequality or opportunity, I would say.
Given the central role of education for the association
between origins and destination,
much interest has been devoted
to what is called the OED triangle.
You have, again, an indirect effect,
origin over education over to destination,
and you have a direct effect, which it says
is via other mechanisms than education
that leads from the origin class and the destination.
It can be seen as only a fragment
of Blau and Duncan's path model, of course,
but I think even if it's a simple thing,
much insight can actually be gained from it,
in this simple three-way association.
The interesting case is that it has been,
from time to time, shown there is an interaction
in this three-way association.
Hout, in a very influential paper,
found that an observed increase in fluidity
in the United States could be accounted for
by increasing number of children or young people
going to university, because the association
between the origin class and the destination class is lower
among those with university education,
and Mike Hout even suggested
that there's no association at all.
I don't believe that.
It may have been in his data,
but there is some problems with that.
Then, the increasing numbers with university education
accounted for a decrease in class mobility,
or rather, he looked, I think, if I remember right,
on status attainment, but never mind,
the mechanisms are, of course, very similar.
This has been shown for several countries.
Florencia Torche, in some very, I think, good papers,
could confirm the association between parental status
and men's status, that it decreases
with increasing levels of education.
But she also found that it doesn't go all the way through,
that is to say, the association between origin class
and destination class was higher among those
with advanced degrees, as compared to those
with bachelor degrees, and this is an intersting case,
because it gives some support to an idea by Sam Lucas
about maximally maintaining equality.
I would interpret it and say that under competition,
children and parents from more-advantaged backgrounds
realize that they have to use their resources
and move up in the educational ladder.
This is part of the problem with much of this research;
the question is, does education mean the same?
When it was when I went to university, I think we were
about 5% and 10% of a cohort,
and does then university education mean the same
as when the present cohort, they are 30%,
or even more than 30% of the cohort goes to university,
which makes a major difference.
So going on here, I would say what about Sweden then?
I have some data from Swedish register data
for cohorts born between '48 and '72,
and it's the whole Swedish population, so it refers
to about two million men and women here.
Here you have exactly a way of looking at the same results.
I put the data in five cross-cohorts,
born '48 to '52, and here, the last one, '68 to '72,
and then you have the association
between origin class and destination class
for those with only basic education,
for those with lower secondary education,
for those with academic secondary education
and lower tertiary, we have those with tertiary education,
and then with long tertiary education.
I did this in order to try to replicate Torche's study.
What we see here is we find exactly the same basic pattern
as in the United States: the less education,
the higher is the association
between origin and destination.
We don't really find the difference between advanced degrees
and degrees on bachelor level, they are intermingled here.
What we see here is, yeah, there is some change over time,
which is, in this, now when we talk here,
not so important, I think.
So, a few words about the model.
It's based on what is called the uniform-difference model
that John Goldthorpe and I developed when we were looking
at social mobility.
It says, like this, that if you compare
the association in each of the 25 tables here
with one of them, this is then the association
among men with only basic education
born in the first cohort.
The point is here that we assume the same basic pattern
of interaction, between origins and destination,
but the strength may differ.
To be precise, if you take an odds ratio in one table
and relate it to the similar odds ratio in another table,
the ratio between these two odds ratios
will be exactly the ratio given
by the parameter values here.
I'm lying a little when I say that these are men,
because the model also includes women.
I put the women in the same, so in principle,
you have 50, actually.
And then it looks like this, and the reason
why I put the women in there was, of course,
that I was curious about what you see here,
that the association is much lower among women
than it is among men.
This was especially the case in the earlier period,
where fewer women went to the labor market,
and it may have been that it was not so important
whether you had this job or that job,
which, apparently, then changed over time.
There's another interesting case with the women,
and that is that here, Torche's result appears, again.
That is to say, okay, we have the basic education women,
we have those with lower secondary, upper secondary
or lower tertiary, then we have those on the bachelor level
and those with advanced degrees.
Actually, there, again, the association is higher.
So, it's an exact replication of Torche's result, actually,
that appears here for women.
It's also worthwhile observing the difference
between women with only basic education,
because apparently, here, I would say
the interpretation is that women with only basic education,
coming from the working class, have very little options
on the labor market.
Okay.
Yeah.
But is it obvious that this is the best way to look at it?
Should we follow Hout in doing this?
As we said, there is a three-way interaction,
so you could look at the interaction some other way.
So why not look at it, what is the association
between education and class, given origin?
In principle, and then it looks like this.
Again, we have a pattern that is similar,
that is to say, it's in principle the same model,
so here you have the group...
Where am I?
What happened?
Okay.
There we are.
We have the group that is from the working class
in the first cohort, and then you have
the skilled working class, you have intermediate occupations
and self-employed, we have the lower, non-manual,
and we have the professional and managerial origins.
And then we could see a very stable pattern,
that the higher the class origin,
the lower is the association between education
and destination class.
This is important.
Let me say that it's not the model that brings out the data
or behaves so nicely, it's because the large sample size,
I would say.
What we can say here is that what this means
is that it's an intersting case.
It's a clear case that children from...
Okay, I can say children.
These are women and it's exactly the same pattern.
What we can say, again, was the interest to have women
in the same model with men because you can see originally,
the association between education and class was much higher
for women than for men, but it decreased much quicker,
so here, is really they are very close,
on the same level or less.
But what we see here, that children from higher origins,
they have more options in choosing jobs based on education,
which is, I think, an important interest to look at.
We could say that
in modernization theory, say like what Treiman wrote
a paper on 1970, right?
Which was a very good paper, actually.
But he came up with this idea that given the development,
and of course, it's the whole functional theory
that is behind it, actually, that given the development
of industrial and post-industrial societies,
competition increases all the time,
which pushes...
Skills and competence will become more important,
and other factors of workers will become less important
in allocation to jobs on the labor market.
And what we can see here is that Sweden doesn't fit
to that pattern, really.
Because one of the things that should happen
is exactly this, this should absolutely not happen
that you can have a difference
in the more education you have, given the origin,
you have more options.
Or, sorry, given the origin, the association
between education and destination actually become weaker,
and this will happen if it's the case
that the upper managerial class increases in size.
If we take the same argument as Hout did
with regard to the association between origin class
and destination, the association between education
and class destinations will decrease, actaully.
Which is an intersting case.
Okay, I realize that I, as always, talk too much.
I would like to end by saying a few words
about whether the rate of social mobility
is responsive to politics.
I would say like this, that politicians
in several countries, including my own, talk very much
about they have to increase social mobility,
and they have to take measures to increase social mobility.
I saw that the British government has now come up,
apparently, with some lot of things with this purpose.
But the question is, can social mobility really increase
as an effect of political action?
By intended political action?
My answer is, on the overall, no.
Upward social mobility, and that is what politicians have
in mind; they don't want to tell their electorate
that, "We want to increase social mobility
"so your kids would have a worse chance
"in the labor market."
It actually happened in a meeting in Britain,
and the then-minister of education,
this was in the previous government,
in the conservative government, came up with a big issue
that they would increase social mobility,
and after a while, I couldn't keep quiet.
I asked him, "How shall you tell your electorate
"who is in the upper part of the social structure,
"how can you go and tell them that, 'Politics work hard
"'that your children shouldn't do as well as you do,
"'or have done.'"
And I got an answer of about 15 minutes that said nothing.
It was a remarkable event, actually.
But okay, influencing social mobility.
First of all, and this is, as I said,
what we observe, of course, this idea of social...
Sorry.
Of social...
Good heavens.
What is it called?
Oh, never mind; the association.
The absolute mobility is, of course, what is observed
and seen, and the issue of what really pushes
the absolute mobility is changes in the social structure,
and the question is, is it really the case that,
with political action, where you can really change this
in order to improve social mobility?
It seems a rather weird idea.
What is, then, the option...
Instead of going on the social selection, or rather,
if you want to instead go on the other major factor
behind social mobility, social fluidity,
to what extent can we influence social fluidity
by political action?
I think the point with the distinction
between primary and secondary effects study,
it seems essential for approaching this question.
Jackson and Jonsson, in this volume
edited by Michelle Jackson, comparing European countries,
they found that there were rather small differences
in the importance of primary effects,
which suggests that this is rather basic
in the selection process; exactly the issues
that goes for why children from more-advantaged classes
do better at school, or more or less the same,
are probably very difficult to influence.
The result will be that should we, by politics,
influence social mobility, we have to go
and try to do it via education, really.
In order to influence social fluidity.
So, what Jackson and Jonsson's result suggests is this.
The question is, to what extent, if we think
of the three factors that Jan and I suggested,
benefits, costs, and probability of success,
you can say that benefits are probably very difficult to...
That they should differ by social class.
The probability of success is probably
also very difficult to influence.
So the only thing left is the cost,
and that seems to be a possibility.
The costs of going to higher education is fairly high,
so if you reduce that cost, that ought to have an effect
on social selection in education.
I'm not so certain.
I think that
children, if under increased competition
for higher education, exactly what Torche then found,
is that okay, under these considerations, still,
children must try to keep their advantage,
and how do they do it?
They continue further up in the educational system.
I think very little happens.
So I would say, I think it's rather improbable
that politicians can find a way to make a major
or even minor effect on social mobility.
Social mobility may change, that I'm not saying,
but the question of intentional political action,
I'm not so certain about.
I would say it like this.
The goal of increased social mobility seems difficult
to reach, and it would take a generation
for it to be realized.
If the aim is to reduce inequality,
a more trafficable way leading to immediate results
would be to reduce inequality of results.
Thank you.
(audience applauds)
- [Janet] Thank you, Robert, you can stay right there.
- I took too long, as always.
- That was a depressing ending, I might add.
(audience chuckles) Questions?
We have about 10 minutes, maybe we could take
a couple of questions.
Let me just mention something I think we said:
we have a reception outside, everyone is of course invited
and that's supposed to be about 6:15 to 7:15,
so I'm gonna push us out in just a few minutes,
but any questions wanna be asked?
Either from the audience or from the microphone over here?
- So, the level of association is lower
on a long tertiary level than on the earlier levels.
So does that, to some extent, moderate your last comment
that even if education saturates,
people would still find ways to...?
- [Robert] I didn't get the question, sorry.
I have to listen a little closer.
- Right.
In your concluding remark, you used Torche's finding.
But in Torche's finding,
even on long-tertiary-level education,
she found that the association between family background
and attainment resurged.
But even after it increased from the level,
it's still lower.
- Yeah, no, of course.
Exactly, okay.
It's clearly the case you will still have this association,
but the point is that, I think there are good arguments
believing that
among those with less education,
what you could say is that in those cases,
the direct effect,
the direct effect of class background
on class destination comes in,
that is, other mechanisms.
The obvious example is, really, which is slightly different,
and that is the self-employed, because the association
between the origin class and the destination class,
for that, amongst those who come from self-employment,
education is much less important,
because there are other factors.
Particularly, of course, if they stay in self-employment,
other factors become more important,
for at least many types of jobs.
But you are right, it still is a considerable difference.
- Right, so does that modify your final argument
that expanding education--
- Well, the final argument is
what should the politicians do?
- So given that, why isn't expanding education a way
to increase intergenerational mobility?
- To?
- Increase intergenerational mobility.
- Let's put it this way, the argument is really like this,
that there are very strong countervailing factors.
The interests of both parents and children
to stay in good conditions in an advantaged position
is such that resources will be brought into the model.
It seems to me, it's very difficult on the political side
to find means where you can get by this basic fact,
and precisely the fact that if now, the kid,
and this is the interesting case where this result
would hold origin constant and look at the association
between education and class destination,
and you'll find that with higher origin,
you have a lower association, which means that kids
from higher origins have other means
to get into good positions.
And all these things are...
As long as we have...
Jones, Hauser, and Featherman suggested that
what we here call social fluidity will be about the same
in nations based on a market system
and based on nuclear families, and I think this is
precisely what is going on here.
These two major institutions in societies
will form the process.
- [Janet] I see another comment over here.
Well, presumably a question, but something tells me
it's a comment.
(audience chuckles)
- Yes, ma'am.
Robert.
I would say, I think, the same thing a little differently.
- Okay.
- Well-educated parents, they have one or two children.
They invest everything in them.
They know how to get through the school system.
Their kids never worry about whether they can afford
to go to school or not, so the C thing disappears,
and then they have connections, their business...
The big thing is how do you tell a parent
that they can't do everything that they can
for their children?
That is the major problem.
That is the big class divide.
Are you gonna be a politician who's gonna say,
"Okay, who's out there with their smart little kid?"
And two parents and worked real hard and got the kid
in Harvard, that, "You, ump, no no!
"You can't do everything you can for him.
"You can't do this and you can't;" of course you can.
And that's the major problem, I think.
- I agree.
- Well, good!
(audience laughs)
Education, as it seems to me, is a by-product.
- But the important point is, still,
you have in a large number of countries,
the politicians come out and say,
"We should increase social mobility."
I suppose it's based on the idea that inequality of results
is not so important if there is a high degree
of equality of opportunity.
But I think--
- No, where you are now is where Solow,
that economist, is, and Piketty and a lot others:
unless you get rid of the inequality to start with,
you're gonna have a real hard time working your way
through a social system to get there.
Thank you, Robert.
- [Janet] Do we have one last question?
I saw a couple of other emphatic nodding faces, hands.
Sandy, can we pull you down here, and we're gonna give you
the last question.
- So you said, rightly, that a big determinant of mobility
is the changing distribution of jobs, or occupations.
Now, that suggests that if the political class wants
to change the distribution, it can change
the distribution of jobs.
It obviously can't change what people do,
because they're not smart enough to do that.
Employers have to do that, but they can change
what people are paid, and what they get to keep,
and if you compress the distribution of the monetary part,
given that you can't compress the distribution
of anything else, then you will have the effect
that the set of jobs that are available
to the next generation are either more equal,
or, in the case of the United States lately,
less equal than the jobs that were available
in a previous generation, and you will therefore have
either more or less mobility of a certain kind,
because you've changed that distribution of payoffs.
Now, that won't have any effect at all
on the rank order of mobility, people will still be moving
up and down, just like in the diagrams,
but what they think has happened to them
will change a lot, I think.
- That could be.
That could be.
I think, still...
Yeah.
Yeah, it may be.
This is an interesting case.
To what extent what people see is exactly absolute mobility?
This idea of the association is something
the sociologists thought up in their minds
and is still hardly out to them.
But no, okay.
The interesting case was that when you say
they compress the income distribution,
but the interesting case, what as I showed before,
the economists in Sweden thought
that they should increase income inequality.
- It is my sad duty to, it's not so sad,
to bring us to a close.
Robert, thank you so much.
(audience applauds)
Thank you.
- [Robert] Thank you for being invited.
- Thank you to the Rainwaters for coming,
and Tim, for all your energy over so many years,
and to so many people in the room here.
Next year, this event will be at the City University
of New York, as I've said, Phil will take Mary's role.
I want you to know, speaking of this topic,
that there was just a big study that came out
by Raj Chetty, which we're all very proud of at CUNY
because he looked at the 10 campuses in this country
that created the most social mobility,
the most likely that students entered
from a disadvantaged background,
and then they themselves had household income
in the top quintile, and six of those 10 colleges
were ours at CUNY, so we were very proud of that.
So that's just a little reason to tell you
why you should all come next year,
because if you're interested in social mobility,
that's our business, and we wanna show off CUNY.
I'm a big CUNY patriot, I'm also a Harvard patriot.
There's a lot more money here than there,
so anyway, there you go.
Thank you so much to everybody,
and please join us at the reception.
(audience applauds)
(pensive, midtempo music)
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